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Abstract
This Article examines treaty body compliance discourse through an examination of the CEDAW
Committee’s jurisprudence related to sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing on the constructivist literature
and the sociological framing literature, Part I of this article introduces adoption and adaptation
as key features for domestically enforcing treaty obligations. Part I also introduces the CEDAW
Committee compliance discourse framework. Through the issue of married women’s property
rights in Rwanda and Uganda, Part II demonstrates the challenges of implementing the adoption
and adaptation process with a circumscribed collaboration approach. Drawing on the construc-
tivist and sociological insights regarding the adoption and adaptation process Part III critiques
the CEDAW Committee’s compliance discourse’s circumscribed approach to collaboration. The
Committee’s emphasis on awareness-oriented programmatic reforms without an appreciation for
customary legal officials as an important resource in the adaptation process minimizes the effec-
tiveness of domestic enforcement mechanisms.
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INTRODUCTION
Human rights scholars and advocates have been at the fore-
front of recognizing the role of norms and values in achieving
compliance with human rights treaty obligations. This is particu-
larly true of scholars and activists interested in gender equality.
It is frequently noted that compliance with treaties such as the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women' ("CEDAW") or the Protocol to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women
in Africa2 ("African Protocol") is challenging because of "en-
trenched traditional attitudes regarding women."' The treaty
body responsible for overseeing compliance with CEDAW, the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Wo-
men ("CEDAW Committee" or "Committee"), 4 recognizes this
challenge and regularly implores states to modify or eliminate
discriminatory social and cultural patterns of conduct. To
achieve this goal state parties are encouraged to utilize strategic
framing for CEDAW norms. The Committee is increasingly rec-
ognizing the role of a state's discursive opportunity structure in
the framing process by recommending that state parties collabo-
rate with influential domestic actors.' Yet the Committee fo-
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discussion I am grateful to the participants at the University of Oregon International
Law Symposium, the Third World Approaches to International Law Conference III,
and the William & Mary Law School faculty workshop. I would also like to thank the
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1. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/
cedaw/text/econvention.htm [hereinafter CEDAW].
2. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa, Sept. 13, 2000, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6 (2003), available at http://
www.achpr.org/english/-info/women en.html [hereinafter African Protocol].
3. Valerie A. Dormady, Status of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1998, 33 INT'L L. 637, 639 (1999).
4. See CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 17.
5. See, e.g., 30th and 31st Sessions of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrim-
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cuses on circumscribed collaboration-collaboration limited to
women's and human rights organizations. The Committee's ju-
risprudence6 does not include recommendations to collaborate
with local elites responsible for administering customary legal
systems. This is a significant omission because many issues re-
lated to social and cultural patterns are within the jurisdiction of
customary law in sub-Saharan African states.
This Article examines treaty body compliance discourse
through an examination of the CEDAW Committee's jurispru-
dence related to sub-Saharan Africa. Domestic enforcement is
recognized as one of the most effective means of enforcing inter-
national legal obligations.7 Absent domestic enforcement, inter-
national legal obligations have to be enforced through interna-
tional legal institutions and states utilizing various combinations
of coercion, pressure, and acculturation. In the context of
human rights the relevant international legal institutions typi-
cally only have advisory powers and are unable to "make" states
take particular action. They utilize discursive strategies that can
prompt or bolster the coercive or persuasive strategies under-
taken by states and non-state actors. Both of these methods of
enforcing human rights obligations are resource intensive and
consequently are used to address a relatively small number of
human rights violations throughout the world. When states have
the capacity and the political will to enforce human rights obli-
gations domestically, the likelihood that violations will be adjudi-
cated and corrected increases significantly.8
Recognizing the value of domestic enforcement, treaty bod-
ies like the CEDAW Committee encourage states to undertake
reforms that will facilitate and strengthen domestic enforcement
ination Against Women, Jan. 12-30, 2004 and July 6-23, 2004, Report of the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, pt. 1, 63, 80, 176, 194, 270, U.N. Doc.
A/59/38 (2004) [hereinafter 30-31st Sessions of CEDAW].
6. See Thomas Buergenthal, The U.N. Human Rights Committee, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B.
UNITED NATIONS L. 341, 351 (2001) (describing the concluding observations of the
Human Rights Committee as a "type of Committee 'jurisprudence"').
7. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of
International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 469, 497 (2005) ("much of international law is
obeyed primarily because domestic institutions create mechanisms for ensuring that a
state abides by its international legal commitments whether or not particular govern-
mental actors wish it to do so."); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2656-57 (1997).
8. See Hathaway, supra note 7, at 499.
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mechanisms.9 Successful domestic enforcement entails an adop-
tion and adaptation process. States must adopt international le-
gal rules by incorporating them into their domestic legal sys-
tem.1" Additionally the international legal obligations and
norms must be translated into local terms through the use of
strategic frames that advantageously situate the obligations and
norms within the state's discursive opportunity structure."
Treaty bodies, such as the CEDAW Committee, make recommen-
dations to state parties to assist with the adoption and adaptation
process.' 2 Based on the CEDAW Committee's sub-Saharan Af-
rica jurisprudence between 1994 and 2006, this treaty body's
compliance discourse can be divided into three categories of rec-
ommendations-structural, legal, and programmatic. Concep-
tualizing compliance in this way illuminates the ways in which
the existing human rights treaty regime directs states to behave.
The overwhelming majority of the recommendations are
programmatic and so are those that focus on adaptation. 3 The
adaptation-oriented recommendations focus on awareness and
knowledge. States are encouraged to undertake awareness-rais-
ing campaigns to publicize CEDAW rights or institute profes-
sional training programs to familiarize legal professionals with
the state's CEDAW obligations.1 4 The adaptation process, how-
ever, requires significantly more than the introduction of infor-
mation. This process requires connecting CEDAW obligations
and norms to the local context, which includes the local mean-
ing-making institutions, and understanding the power dynamics
of these institutions and actors. In other words, the adaptation
process is tied to the state's political opportunity structure and
9. See id. at 500.
10. Koh refers to this aspect of the process as legal internalization. See Koh, supra
note 7, at 2656-57.
11. Koh would refer to this aspect of the process as social internalization. See id.
However, I remain agnostic as to whether the norms must be internalized or merely
recognized as socially valuable. The successful acculturation of the target audience may
be sufficient for bringing about the required reforms. See infra note 72; see generally Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical
and Normative Challenges, 54 DuKE L.J. 983 (2005) (hereinafter Goodman &Jinks, Inter-
national Law].
12. See generally General Recommendations Adopted by The Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/
daw/cedaw/recommendations/index.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2008).
13. See infra notes 143-58 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
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more specifically to its discursive opportunity structure. 15
Local elites play a critical role in successfully navigating this
process. They serve as influential allies in the deployment of the
frames created for the adaptation process, but they are also an
indispensable resource for the translating components of the ad-
aptation process. The CEDAW Committee is increasingly recog-
nizing that collaboration with local entities is valuable. This de-
velopment systematically began in 2004, and since that time the
Committee has generally recommended that states collaborate
with civil society organizations such as women's organizations
and human rights organizations. 6 Yet recommendations to col-
laborate with the local elites responsible for administering the
customary legal systems are missing from the jurisprudence. As
most individuals within these states frequently encounter the
customary legal system and rarely interact with the statutory sys-
tem, this circumscribed approach to collaboration significantly
limits the impact of international law.
Drawing on the constructivist literature and the sociological
framing literature, Part I of this article introduces adoption and
adaptation as key features for domestically enforcing treaty obli-
gations. Part I also introduces the CEDAW Committee compli-
ance discourse framework. Through the issue of married wo-
men's property rights in Rwanda and Uganda, Part II demon-
strates the challenges of implementing the adoption and
adaptation process with a circumscribed collaboration approach.
Drawing on the constructivist and sociological insights regarding
the adoption and adaptation process Part III critiques the
CEDAW Committee's compliance discourse's circumscribed ap-
proach to collaboration. The Committee's emphasis on aware-
ness-oriented programmatic reforms without an appreciation for
customary legal officials as an important resource in the adapta-
tion process minimizes the effectiveness of domestic enforce-
ment mechanisms.
I. FACILITATING DOMESTIC ENFORCEMENT
Current scholarship on human rights presents a daunting
picture of state compliance with human rights agreements.
Scholars using a variety of theoretical and methodological ap-
15. See infra notes 66, 70 and accompanying text.
16. See generally 30-31st Sessions of CEDAW, supra note 5.
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proaches conclude that it is not uncommon for states to formally
commit to human rights agreements, but fail to change their
practices to conform to the treaty requirements.17 This body of
research offers a variety of theories regarding what motivates
states to comply with their human rights obligations, and offers
normative prescriptions for reforming human rights treaty re-
gimes to obtain better compliance. 8 This literature provides in-
sights on state behavior generally, for example states can be so-
cialized or states respond to credible threats, but to date the
compliance literature has taken a narrow view of compliance by
focusing on the legal rights outlined in a treaty.19 Human rights
treaties, however, articulate a broad range of goals that include
promoting and realizing specific rights, in addition to protecting
these rights.2 The provisions of a given treaty seek to advance
each of these goals. Steiner, Alston, and Goodman refer to five
types of duties that are created in human rights treaties: respect
the rights of others; create structural machinery that is essential
to the realization of rights; protect rights and prevent violations;
provide goods and services to satisfy rights; and promote rights.21
The protection of rights is the paradigmatic type of provision in
a human rights treaty, and thus the emphasis of much of the
compliance literature. For example, CEDAW requires state par-
ties to grant women "in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to
that of men and the same opportunities to exercise that capac-
17. See generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization
and International Human Rights Law, 54 DuKE L.J. 621 (2004) [hereinafter Goodman &
Jinks, Influence States]; Goodman & Jinks, International Law, supra note 11; Emilie M.
Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of
Empty Promises, 110 AM.J. Soc. 1373 (2005); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Trea-
ties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE LJ. 1935 (2002).
18. See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, Influence States, supra note 17, at 638-56, 700-02;
Goodman &Jinks, International Law, supra note 11, at 984-89; Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui,
supra note 17, at 1379-83, 1395-1401; Hathaway, supra note 17, at 1942-62, 2002-20.
19. See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, Influence States, supra note 17, at 687-99; Hafner-
Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 17, at 1374; Hathaway, supra note 17, at 1937-42.
20. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 1; African Protocol, supra note 2.
21. See HENRYJ. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON & RvAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HutmAN-
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAw, POLITICS, MORALS 187-89 (3d ed. 2008). These duties can be
categorized as structural, programmatic, or legal. Respecting rights, protecting rights,
and promoting rights are all legal obligations. Creating structural machinery, prevent-
ing violations, and providing goods and services to satisfy rights are each structural obli-
gations and the last two in this list would also qualify as programmatic obligations. See
infra notes 133-145 and accompanying text.
2009]
786 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:781
ity."'22 The African Protocol states that "[e]very woman shall
have the right to dignity inherent in a human being and to the
recognition and protection of her human and legal rights. '23
Yet other provisions of these treaties do not articulate clear legal
rules that states must implement and adhere to, rather they ex-
press a commitment to a principle or goal that can be realized in
a variety of ways. For example, CEDAW requires state parties to:
[Mlodify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men
and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of
prejudices and customary and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either
of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women
24
Similarly, the African Protocol states that "[w]omen shall
have the right to live in a positive cultural context and to partici-
pate at all levels in the determination of cultural policies."25
Compliance with these kinds of provisions cannot be measured
solely by examining the legal rules operating within a state. Con-
sequently the treaty monitoring bodies adopt a broader concep-
tualization of compliance, one that recognizes state efforts
aimed at changing the social meanings attached to particular
practices and groups.
This Article focuses on an under-analyzed resource regard-
ing human rights treaty compliance-treaty body reports. The
statements and evaluations of human rights treaty bodies play an
important role in articulating international standards for compli-
ance. Within the international human rights regime multiple ac-
tors ranging from the United Nations ("U.N.") to regional orga-
nizations to individual states can and do play a role in holding
states accountable for their legal obligations. The U.N. is, how-
ever, one of the most prominent international organizations re-
sponsible for enforcing human rights obligations. 26 The U.N.
22. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 15(2).
23. African Protocol, supra note 2, art. 3.
24. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 5(a).
25. African Protocol, supra note 2, art. 17(1).
26. Enforcement as used in this Article refers to "all measures intended and
proper to induce respect for human rights." Rudolf Bernhardt, General Report, in INTER-
NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 145 (Rudolf Bernhardt & John Anthony
Jolowicz eds., 1985). It can refer to the adoption of resolutions, recommendations, or
other "hortatory activities of the UN." STEINER, ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 21, at
736.
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system is divided into the charter-based organizations and the
treaty-based organizations. The charter-based organizations are
those that are provided for in the U.N. Charter, such as the Gen-
eral Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Com-
mission on Human Rights. The treaty-based organizations are
the committees created by a specific human rights treaty to mon-
itor compliance with that specific treaty. There are seven treaty-
based organizations in the U.N. system. Each of the following
treaties have a corresponding committee: the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"), In-
ternational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination ("CERD"), International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
("CEDAW"), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT"), Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child ("CRC"), and the International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Work-
ers and Members of Their Families ("CMW") .27
These committees have three main functions: reviewing and
commenting upon state party reports, issuing general recom-
mendations on specific treaty provisions, and receiving and con-
sidering individual communications. 2 This last function is usu-
27. See Office of the United Nations (U.N.) High Comm'r for Human Rights,
Human Rights Bodies, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBo-
dies.aspx (last visited Nov. 30, 2008). On December 13, 2006, the U.N. General Assem-
bly adopted the eighth human rights treaty, the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/
106, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/law/pdf/disabilities-convention.pdf. The Convention was open for ratification
on March 30, 2007, and will enter into force once twenty states have ratified it. See id.
arts. 42, 45(1). As of February 28, 2008, 137 states have signed the treaty and seventeen
states have ratified it. See Office of the U.N. High Comm'r of Human Rights, Disability,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/disability/index.htm (last visited Nov. 30,
2008).
28. Regional organizations responsible for enforcing legal obligations under re-
gional human rights agreements utilize a similar process. For example, the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights established the African Commission on Human
Rights ("Commission") as the body responsible for monitoring compliance. See African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 30, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, [hereinaf-
ter African Charter], available at http://www.africa-Union.org/root/au/Documents/
Treaties/Text/Banjul%20Charter.pdf.
Pursuant to Article 62 of the African Charter, state parties are required to submit a
report every two years "on the legislative or other measures taken, with a view to giving
effect to the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed by the present Charter."
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ally undertaken pursuant to an optional protocol that grants the
committee jurisdiction to receive and consider communications
from individuals "claiming to be victims of a violation of any of
the rights set forth in the Convention by that State Party. '29 The
committee members are nominated by state parties and elected
at a meeting of the state parties." The members are "experts of
high moral standing and competence in the field covered by the
Convention."31  Historically lawyers dominated the CEDAW
Committee, but in recent years lawyers have not exceeded one-
half of the Committee.32
The review and comment on state party reports is the pri-
mary activity of all of these treaty bodies. A primary purpose of
state parties submitting these reports is establishing a construc-
tive dialogue between the state and the committee. 33 More spe-
cifically the production of state reports enables state parties to
undertake a comprehensive review of their legislation, adminis-
trative rules, procedures and practices for conformity with the
See id. art. 62. The Commission is also tasked with articulating principles and rules to
assist in implementing the African Charter. See id. art. 45(1) (b). While the African
Commission on Human Rights does not have jurisdiction to review individual com-
plaints, it can receive communications from state parties regarding another state party's
alleged violation of the African Charter. See id. art. 47. The culmination of such a com-
munication is a report from the Commission to the states concerned that is also com-
municated to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. See id. art. 52.
29. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women art. 2, Oct. 15, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83; see also Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
arts. 17, 22, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture];
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pmbl.,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302; International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 14(6) (a), Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinaf-
ter Convention against Racial Discrimination].
30. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 17(1).
31. Id.; see also Convention Against Torture, supra note 29, art. 17; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 28, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Conven-
tion against Racial Discrimination, supra note 29, art. 8.
32. See Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Membership, http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/cedaw/membership.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2008) (members' re-
sumes reveal ten lawyers out of twenty-two members for the 2008 Committee and eleven
lawyers out of twenty-two members for the 2009 Committee). The professional compo-
sition of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women ("CEDAW") Committee is likely to have implications for the types of recom-
mendations the Committee makes to states. See infra notes 133-145 and accompanying
text.
33. STEINER, ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 21, at 851.
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treaty; ensures that states monitor the situation on the ground
regularly to determine whether the rights provided for in the
treaty are being adhered to; allows states to demonstrate that
policy-making has been undertaken; encourages states to consult
with various stakeholders within the state in formulating, imple-
menting, and reviewing relevant policies; provides a basis for
states and the treaty bodies to evaluate a state's progress in realiz-
ing the treaty obligations; enables states to better understand the
challenges they face in realizing the rights provided for in the
treaty; and enables the treaty bodies and the states to develop an
understanding of the common problems faced by states and to
exchange information on best practices. 4  CEDAW requires
state parties to "report on the legislative, judicial, administrative,
or other measures which they have adopted to give effect to the
provisions of the present Convention and on the progress made
in this respect."35 The reports may "indicate factors and difficul-
ties affecting the degree of fulfillment of obligations under the
present Convention."36 The treaty bodies play a central role in
interpreting and enforcing the U.N. human rights treaties. The
manner in which these bodies operationalize compliance has sig-
nificant implications for the way in which states understand what
is expected of them. As the central body responsible for moni-
toring states and responding to individual communications,
states reasonably rely upon the treaty bodies' advice through the
recommendations offered. 7
Despite significant disagreement as to why states adhere to
34. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Report on the Third Session, 87-
89, U.N. Doc. E/1989/22 (Feb. 17, 1989).
35. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 18(1). The African Protocol similarly requires state
parties to report on the "legislative and other measures undertaken for the full realisa-
tion of the rights" recognized within the African Protocol. African Protocol, supra note
2, art. 26. This treaty requires that the reporting of this information be included in the
state party's periodic report required under the African Charter. See id. These reports
are to be submitted every two years. See African Charter, supra note 28, art. 62.
36. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 18(2).
37. Yet this reliance may at times be misplaced because of the manner in which
these committees typically make decisions-by consensus. Consensus decision making,
while allowing the committee to speak uniformly and clearly, requires compromise and
"the blunting of positions." STEINER, ALSTON & GOODMoN, supra note 21, at 847. In the
end, this can lead to recommendations that are not particularly bold and may not con-
vey the sentiments of other entities active in treaty enforcement, such as individual
states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. Yet
these bodies are the entities with the mandate to enforce the treaty, so it is not unrea-
sonable for states to rely on their recommendations.
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their international legal obligations, there is widespread agree-
ment that domestic enforcement is one of the most effective
means of enforcing treaty obligations." Treaties operate as
binding law within ratifying states in one of two ways: the treaty is
automatically incorporated into domestic law upon ratification
or through implementing legislation giving legal effect to the
treaty obligations. 39  Domestic law and domestic legal institu-
tions provide a means of enforcing international legal obliga-
tions. ° Yet many states that ratify human rights treaties do not
enact all of the necessary implementing legislation.41 Addition-
ally, numerous states' legal institutions are not capable of enforc-
ing the treaty obligations. Bolstering legal structures has been
the focus of rule of law programs operated by inter-governmen-
tal organizations and various states. Typically these programs
seek to train judges, lawyers, and law enforcement officers, build
courts and prisons, and implement legal reforms that promote
consistency and transparency.4
2
The technical emphasis of rule of law programs has recently
been questioned by scholars who contend that effective legal sys-
tems depend not only on the right institutions, laws, and person-
nel, but also on culture, or the acceptance of the treaty norms as
legitimate.43 In emphasizing the role of culture in effective law
enforcement these scholars recognize that adaptation is an im-
portant component of creating and strengthening domestic en-
forcement mechanisms. Yet implementing the reforms neces-
sary for effective domestic enforcement does require the struc-
38. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 7, at 497 (2005) (noting that "much of interna-
tional law is obeyed primarily because domestic institutions create mechanisms for en-
suring that a state abides by its international legal commitments whether or not particu-
lar governmental actors wish it to do so.").
39. See Alan Brudner, The Domestic Enforcement of International Covenants on Human
Rights: A Theoretical Framework, 35 U. TORONTO L.J. 219, 221 (1985).
40. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Adrien Katherine Wing & Tyler Murray Smith, The New African Union
And Women's Rights, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 38 (2003) (noting that
many African countries have ratified treaties that protect women but few have enacted
the necessary implementing legislation).
42. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev./Office of Democracy and Governance, Wash. D.C.,
Achievements in Building and Maintaining the Rule of Law, OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES 90,
98, 141 (Nov. 2002), available at http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democracyand.gov-
ernance/publications/pdfs/pnacr220.pdf [hereinafter Rule of Law Achievements].
43. SeeJANE STROMSETH ET AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF
LAw AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 68-77 (2006); see also Lan Cao, Book Review, 101
AM. J. INT'L. L. 901, 903 (2008) (reviewing Stromseth's book).
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tural reforms that are part of traditional rule of law initiatives.44
These initiatives seek to implement a legal system in which law
rather than discretionary power dominates and all individuals
are equal before the law. 45 Common approaches include rewrit-
ing constitutions, laws, and regulations; significantly reforming
state institutions; retraining judges, lawyers, and bureaucrats;
and restructuring court systems, police forces, and prisons."6
The existence of these technical aspects of the rule of law is a
prerequisite for enforcing domestic law and international
human rights obligations. 47  This increases the likelihood that
the state will have the structural capacity to identify, prosecute,
and punish those running afoul of the state's international legal
obligations.
The CEDAW Committee recognizes the value of domestic
enforcement for increasing state compliance with CEDAW."8
Achieving domestic enforcement requires that state parties have
the legal and structural capacity to create and enforce legal
rights and obligations. An impressive body of literature exists
identifying the benefits of the structural or technical features of
rule of law reform." This Article focuses instead on the need to
44. See STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 43, at 80-84.
45. See Thomas Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 3, 4 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006) (arguing that
"[t]he rule of law can be defined as a system in which the laws are public knowledge,
are clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone."); see also FRANK BEALEY, THE
BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: A USER's GUIDE TO ITS TERMS 290 (1999)
(explaining A.V. Dicey's conception of the rule of law "as embodying the predomi-
nance of law over discretionary authority; equality before the law .... ").
46. See Carothers, supra note 45, at 4; see also Rule of Law Achievements, supra note
42, at 90, 98, 141.
47. Regardless of the manner in which international law operates as binding law
within a ratifying state, through automatic incorporation or implementing legislation,
the international treaty obligations become part of the state's domestic law. See Bruder,
supra note 39, at 221. As such the enforcement of these obligations, like domestically
created law, depends upon the existence of functioning legal institutions. See also, e.g.,
Rule of Law Achievements, supra note 42, at 139-40 (noting United States Agency for In-
ternational Development ("USAID") support for reestablishing the law school at the
University of Rwanda and strengthening the capacity of Rwanda's Ministry of Justice);
see also id. at 147-48 (detailing USAID support for re-codifying Ugandan law and
strengthening the quality of legal training at the Makerere University Faculty of Law).
Additionally, support from officials, particularly high-level executive officials, and pub-
lic acceptance of the legitimacy of the norms underlying the substantive and procedural
legal reforms, increases the likelihood that the state will have the political will to em-
power the legal institutions to undertake the necessary enforcement tasks. See id. at 25.
48. See, e.g., 30-31st Sessions of CEDAW, supra note 5, pt. 1, 102, 154, 170.
49. See generally Carothers, supra note 45; Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of
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change the social meanings attached to traditions and practices
that conflict with CEDAW obligations. This is an approach to
legal reform that emphasizes the need for norms to be accepted
as legitimate within the society.50 Absent such acceptance
"courts are just buildings,judges are just bureaucrats, and consti-
tutions are just pieces of paper."51
Strategic framing is an approach utilized by advocates and
social movement organizations to change social meanings within
a society.52 The CEDAW Committee overwhelmingly recom-
mends that state parties undertake this strategy to comply with
particular types of CEDAW obligations.5 3  Committee recom-
mendations over the last seven years have shifted from present-
ing structural reform and adaptation efforts as mutually exclu-
sive to recognizing the importance of collaboration with mean-
ing-making institutions within the state parties. There is a
growing appreciation of the role that the discursive opportunity
structure plays in the adaptation process. 54 However, the collab-
oration encouraged is limited. The Committee increasingly en-
courages states to collaborate with women's and human rights
organizations, 55 but collaboration with officials within the cus-
tomary legal system is not advanced.
When human rights scholars and activists talk about the
normative or cultural changes that must take place within a soci-
ety before human rights laws can be effectively enforced, they
are typically referring to the reframing of a social issue. 56 There
the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 31
(Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
50. The legitimacy of the norms can be based on acceptance of the norms or the
recognition that the norms are valued by key members of the international community.
The adaptation process as conceptualized in this Article can accommodate persuasion
and acculturation as mechanisms of state socialization. See infra note 72 and accompa-
nying text.
51. STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 43, at 76; see also Abby Morrow Richardson, Wo-
men's Inheritance Rights in Africa: The Need to Integrate Cultural Understanding and Legal
Reform, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 19, 19 (2004) (noting that statutory reform without changes
in customary law has "no practical effect on the great majority of the population.").
52. See David A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Move-
ment Participation, 51 Am. Soc. REv. 464, 468 (1986).
53. See, e.g., 30-31st Sessions of CEDAW, supra note 5, pt. 1, 11 71, 80, 116, 162.
54. See MYRA MARX FERREE ET AL., SHAPING ABORTION DISCOURSE: DEMOCRACY AND
THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 62 (2002). For further discus-
sion, see infta notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., 30-31st Sessions of CEDAW, supra note 5, pt. 1, 1 80.
56. The term frame was first introduced by Erving Goffman to refer to "schemata
CEDAW, COMPLIANCE, AMD CUSTOM
is an understanding that new legal rules and national policies
will not be enacted, adopted, or enforced until the social mean-
ings attached to the targeted practices or people are changed.
For example, opponents of female genital cutting ("FGC") have
been successful in changing the social meaning of that practice
in a rural community in Egypt." Opponents of the practice un-
dertook an education campaign targeting women, religious lead-
ers, and unmarried men, which constructed FGC as a literacy,
family planning, and health care issue rather than one necessary
to protect the chastity of young women.5" In Rwanda, gender
equity advocates were able to alter the social meaning attached
to women's political participation. These advocates successfully
framed women's political participation as a necessary compo-
nent of unity and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda.59
Many of the programmatic reforms recommended by the
CEDAW Committee similarly focus on the state reframing issues
related to gender equality.6" Framing is one way that individuals
and organizations align their conception of a social issue with
the interpretive framework of other members of the society in
order to gain adherents and constituents.6' Successful frame
of interpretation" that allow an individual "to locate, perceive, identify, and label a
seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences. ... ERING GOFFMAN, FRAME
ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE 21 (1974). It is used within
the sociological literature on social movements to refer to:
an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there'
by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, exper-
iences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment
.... Collective action frames not only perform this focusing and punctuating
role; they also function simultaneously as modes of attribution and articula-
tion.
David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Master Frames and Cycles of Protest, in FRONTIERS IN
SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 133, 137 (Aldon D. Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds.,
1992).
57. See Lan Cao, Culture Change, 47 VA.J. INT'L L. 357, 405 (2007). Cao states that
"if a cultural norm such as female genital mutilation carries a certain socially con-
structed meaning that is traditionally deemed desirable, the underlying meaning must
be changed before the cultural norm can be successfully altered." Id.
58. See id.
59. See Angela M. Banks, Challenging Political Boundaries in Post-Conflict States, 29 U.
PA. J. INT'L L. 105, 157 (2007).
60. See infra notes 146-157 and accompanying text.
61. "Adherents are those individuals and organizations that believe in the goals of
the movement" while constituents provide resources for the movement. John D. McCar-
thy & Mayer N. Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theoy, 82 Am.
J. Soc. 1212, 1221 (1977).
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alignment requires that the frame resonate with the broader cul-
ture and existing values to enable the frame to appear natural
and familiar.62 Individuals and organizations draw on a variety
of cultural norms and values in constructing their frames to
achieve resonance.63
Pursuing a framing strategy without connecting it to the rel-
evant features of a state's discursive opportunity structure im-
pedes the development of effective domestic enforcement. Yet
this is the approach that many sub-Saharan African states have
undertaken.64 Deploying an awareness campaign or providing
CEDAW training for legal officials is easy to document and easier
to implement than reforms that require collaboration with key
components of meaning-making institutions. This is particularly
challenging when some aspects of the framing strategy seek to
challenge aspects of the same meaning-making institutions. Yet
without this type of strategy, the programmatic reforms do not
challenge the status quo. Consequently few if any changes are
made within the state that bring the state's actions closer to con-
forming to the substantive requirements of the treaty. The quest
for securing married women's access to and ownership of mari-
tal property in Uganda and Rwanda demonstrates the challenges
states face in implementing reforms that actualize CEDAW obli-
gations without engaging all of the legal institutions that serve as
meaning-making institutions within the state.65
62. The acceptance of a new frame is related to its placement within the discursive
opportunity structure. See FERREE ET AL., supra note 54, at 70 ("[i]n all public arenas...
social problems that can be related to deep mythic themes or broad cultural preoccupa-
tions have a higher probability of competing successfully." (quoting Stephen Hilgartner
and Charles L. Bosk, The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arenas Model, 94 AM. J.
Soc. 53, 71 (1988))); Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social
Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. Rhv. Soc. 611, 619-22, 624 (2000); Rita
K. Noonan, Women Against the State: Political Opportunities and Collective Action Frames in
Chile's Transition to Democracy, 10 Soc. FORUM 81, 94 (1995); see also Banks, supra note
59, at 157 (additional discussion of the role of framing by gender equity advocates in
post-conflict states).
63. But see Myra Marx Ferree, Resonance and Radicalism: Feminist Framing in the Abor-
tion Debates of the United States and Germany, 109 AM.J. Soc. 304, 305 (2003) (noting that
resonant frames are less radical than nonresonant frames and may be utilized by activ-
ists to achieve more satisfactory long-term results).
64. See infra Part I.B.
65. See infra Part II.
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A. Adaptation
Adaptation is the process by which international legal obli-
gations and norms are translated into local terms through the
use of strategic frames. The strategic frames utilized situate the
international obligations and norms within the local discursive
opportunity structure.6 6 The discursive opportunity structure is
the "framework of ideas and meaning-making institutions"
within the state.67 This is the context within which framing con-
tests occur. It is filled with hills, valleys, barriers, and traps that
offer advantages and disadvantages in uneven ways to the partici-
pants in the framing contest.68
Within the sociological literature on framing, scholars have
empirically demonstrated, and theoretically accounted for, a re-
lationship between the political opportunity structure and frame
resonance.69 Through analyzing a society's political opportunity
structure, scholars have accounted for the emergence and sus-
tainability of particular frames within public discourse.7 0 A key
66. The discursive opportunity structure is a sub-structure within a state's broader
political opportunity structure, which is discussed below. See infra note 70.
67. FERREE ET AL., supra note 54, at 62.
68. Id.; see Banks, supra note 59, at 153-60 (applying this concept to framing con-
tests during post-conflict constitution making).
69. See FERREE ET AL., supra note 54, at 61-63; see generally RETHINKING COMPARATIVE
CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY: REPERTOIRES OF EVALUATION IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES
(Mich~le Lamont & Laurent Th~venot eds., 2000).
70. The political opportunity structure refers to the "institutional and cultural ac-
cess points" that enable individuals to bring their claims to the political forums of a
state. FERREE ET AL., supra note 54, at 62. It has been used to explain when collective
action occurs. See id.; SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 76-77 (1998). Increases in political access, influential allies, di-
vided elites, and declining state repression are the components of the political opportu-
nity structure initially identified by Sidney Tarrow. See id. A sub-structure within the
political opportunity structure is the discursive opportunity structure, which refers to
the "framework of ideas and meaning-making institutions" within the state that "chan-
nel and organize discourse." FERREE ET AL., supra note 54, at 62. The discursive oppor-
tunity structure has three main categories: political, socio-cultural, and mass media. See
id. at 63-64.
The political components include the government and the role of the state
and political parties within the society. The socio-cultural components in-
clude the worldviews, values, norms, ways of thinking, practices, and resources
within a society and the rules that support these elements. The socio-cultural
components "provide a pool of potential legitimating devices for particular
ways of framing an issue and justifying one's position on it." Finally, the mass
media includes journalistic outlets like newspapers, television, and radio.
Banks, supra note 59, at 154-55 (quoting FERREE ET AL., supra note 54, at 70).
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feature of the political opportunity structure for an analysis of
the CEDAW recommendations is the role of influential allies.
In seeking to promote the adaptation process as related to
CEDAW norms, the state has to identify or create frames that will
adequately translate these norms for the local context.7 This is
a challenging process, as individuals advancing such frames have
to package the international legal obligations and underlying
norms in familiar terms that simultaneously confront existing
understandings of power relationships.72 A key norm underly-
ing CEDAW is gender equality. Advancing frames to promote
CEDAW will unsettle certain entrenched ideas and practices.73
Developing allies among customary legal officials can be useful
in the adaptation process because it is the application of custom-
ary legal rules that is often the most significant barrier to alter-
ing practices that do not comply with CEDAW. 4
71. See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOcALJUSTICE 135 (2006).
72. See id. at 222. This Article discusses adaptation strategies that focus more on
internalization than acculturation. The adaptation process could focus on accultura-
tion rather than focusing on making substantive connections between the local discur-
sive opportunity structure and international legal obligations and norms. More specifi-
cally, the process could frame the international legal obligations and norms as impor-
tant to and valued by members of the international community who are part of the
target state's reference group. See infra notes 103-124 and accompanying text for a
discussion of acculturation and state behavior. An acculturation-focused adaptation
process would focus on identifying an appropriate reference group and ways to commu-
nicate the value of CEDAW obligations and norms to that reference group. This can be
a delicate undertaking as referencing the activities or values of Western states can be
counterproductive at times. For example, during Uganda's Parliamentary debates re-
garding land reform, few references to international law or international norms were
made regarding women's land rights. Yet of the few references made, one expressed
the idea that co-ownership is a foreign concept that will destabilize the family structure.
See Gerald Businge, Did Women Activists Tactfully Sneak Co-Ownership into the New Land
Bill?, NEW VISION (Uganda), July 1, 2003.
73. This is an example of the types of hills, valleys, barriers, and traps that exist in
framing contests. In responding to justifications for familiar practices, advocates will
find themselves countering alternative familiar frames.
74. Certain activists reject this approach, finding local elites to be their biggest
opponents. See Aili Mari Tripp, Women's Movements, Customary Law, and Land Rights in
Africa: The Case of Uganda, 7 AFR. STUD. Q. 1, 9 (2004), available at http://
www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i4al.pdf (arguing against the reform of customary law);
Ann Whitehead & Dzodzi Tsikata, Policy Discourses on Women's Land Rights in Sub-Saharan
Africa: The Implications of the Re-turn to the Customary, 3 J. AGRAmAN CHANCGE 67, 94
(2003). Regardless of how human rights ideas like those within CEDAW are repack-
aged, they are "a radical challenge to patriarchy." MERRY, supra note 71, at 221. Such a
challenge will be resisted by those within a community who benefit from the privileges
of patriarchy. Yet assuming that all customary legal officials reject CEDAW norms and
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My conception of adaptation draws upon the work of an-
thropologist Sally Engle Merry. Merry has demonstrated that in
order for human rights ideas to be effective they must be appro-
priated and translated into the vernacular.75 Merry's research is
instructive for analyzing the CEDAW Committee's recommenda-
tions because it demonstrates the value of collaboration with
meaning-making institutions in the adaptation process. Merry
contends that while institutions must respond to individuals'
rights claims as being important, reasonable, and significant, key
components of the community's discursive opportunity structure
influence whether or not such claims will be seen as important,
reasonable, and significant.76 Drawing on the sociological fram-
ing literature, Merry notes that the translation of human rights
ideas requires that the ideas "be framed in images, symbols, nar-
ratives, and religious or secular language that resonate with the
local community."7 7 Local ideas and meaning-making institu-
tions influence the ability of particular frames to resonate suc-
cessfully.78
failing to seek common ground impedes shifting the social value and role of women
within society.
75. See MERRY, supra note 71, at 1.
The concept of vernacularization was developed to explain the nineteenth-
century process by which national languages in Europe separated, moving
away from the medieval transnational use of Latin and creating a new and
more differentiated sense of nationhood in Europe. Human rights language
is similarly being extracted from the universal and adapted to national and
local communities.
Id. at 219 (citations omitted). The vernacularization process entails appropriation and
translation. Id. at 135. Appropriation is the process by which the "programs, interven-
tions, and ideas developed by activists in one setting" are replicated in another setting.
Id. This is often a transnational process and "requires knowledge of approaches in
other countries, and, in many cases, the ability to attract funding and political sup-
port." Id. "Translation is the process of adjusting the rhetoric and structure of [the
appropriated] programs or interventions to local circumstances." Id. There are three
dimensions to the translation process: framing human rights ideas and institutions in
ways that resonate locally, tailoring human rights ideas and institutions to local struc-
tural conditions, and defining or redefining the target population. See id. at 220 (noting
that the local structural conditions include the economic, political, and kinship sys-
tems).
76. See id. at 215.
77. Id. at 220.
78. See id. at 222 (noting the success of a frame "depends on features of social
class, gender, race, and ethnicity that make up the social hierarchies of modern
states."). For example, in Hong Kong the idea that batterers should not hit their
spouses was presented as an aspect of Confucian ideas about marriage. Linking the
desired behavior to Confucianism was successful because Confucianism was a key com-
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State actors seeking to adapt international legal obligations
and norms to the local context must make decisions about who
will participate in creating the strategy, how the participants will
participate, and how decisions will be made. Similarly these state
actors have to decide what the content of the frame will be, what
aspects of the discursive opportunity structure it will reference,
and how the frame will be deployed. State collaboration with
local elites, respected individuals within the local legal, political,
economic, religious, and social communities, is often necessary
to facilitate adaptation.
Adaptation requires states and their inhabitants to accept
the legitimacy of international legal obligations and norms.79 I
remain agnostic as to whether a state or its inhabitants must in-
ternalize these obligations and norms or merely be acculturated
to them. 0 Despite disagreement regarding the mechanism by
which norms influence state behavior, constructivist scholars em-
phasize the role of norms in influencing state behavior. 81 As
Martha Finnemore has noted "[tihe international system can
change what states want . . . not by constraining states with a
given set of preferences from acting, but by changing their pref-
ponent of the society's discursive opportunity structure, specifically the socio-cultural
components. Id. at 220. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text for discussion of
the discursive opportunity structure.
79. As conceptualized in this Article, the state is not a monolithic entity with a
single identity. Rather states "represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of
whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purposively in world polit-
ics." Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Polit-
ics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513, 518 (1997). While the CEDAW Committee addresses a state
party in the traditional international law unitary actor sense, I contend that the recom-
mendations are directed to and picked up by certain domestic actors within the state
who must work to persuade or acculturate other domestic actors in addition to govern-
ment officials. For example, when the gender ministry within a specific state party
sponsors an awareness-raising campaign on women's literacy, officials within the execu-
tive branch may be targets of the campaign as much as teachers in rural communities.
80. Compare Koh, supra note 7, at 2656-57 (discussing internalization), with Good-
man & Jinks, Influence States, supra note 17, at 638-56 (discussing acculturation).
81. See, e.g., MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 4-5 (1998) [hereinafter KECK & SiK-
KINK, ACTIVISTS]; Kathryn Sikkink, Restructuring World Politics: The Limits and Asymmetries
of Soft Power, in RESTRUCTURING WORLD POLITICS: TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS,
NETWORKS, AND NORMS 301, 303 (Sanjeev Khagram et al. eds., 2002) (persuasion)
[hereinafter Sikkink, Restructuring]; Goodman &Jinks, Influence States, supra note 17, at
638-56 (acculturation); Koh, supra note 7, at 2646 (internalization through persuasion).
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erences."
82
Harold Koh, through his transnational legal process theory,
emphasizes the role of internalization. 83  Koh contends that
states engage in a three-step process culminating with the inter-
nalization of international legal norms, which facilitates compli-
ance.84 Interaction, interpretation, and internalization are the
three steps of the process. 85 Transnational actors instigate inter-
action with other states that can lead to the negotiation of an
international treaty.86 The treaty text adopted denotes a com-
mon understanding of the articulated norms, an understanding
reached through the various interactions during the drafting ses-
sions.8 7 Additional meetings allow for additional interactions
and interpretations, which "help to reconstitute the interests and
even the identities of the participants in the process."88
Koh identifies three types of internalization: legal, political,
and social.89 Legal internalization occurs when a norm is incor-
porated into a state's domestic legal system, "through executive
action, judicial interpretation, legislative action, or some combi-
nation" thereof. ° When political elites accept the relevant
norms and adopt them as a matter of government policy, politi-
cal internalization has taken place."1 Social internalization exists
when a norm has "so much public legitimacy that there is wide-
spread general obedience .... -02 Social internalization like ad-
aptation focuses on the public legitimacy of the international le-
gal obligations and norms. It is this type of reform that the
CEDAW Committee seeks to facilitate through its awareness-ori-
ented programmatic recommendations. 3
The transnational advocacy network theory similarly empha-
82. MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 5-6
(1996).
83. See Harold HongJu Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183-84
(1996).
84. See id.
85. See Koh, supra note 7, at 2646; see also Eric Neumayer, Do International Human
Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?, 49J. CONFLICT RESOL. 925, 929 (2005).
86. See Koh, supra note 7, at 2646; see also Neumayer, supra note 85, at 929.
87. See Koh, supra note 7, at 2646; see also Neumayer, supra note 85, at 929.
88. Koh, supra note 7, at 2646.
89. See id. at 2656-57.
90. Id. at 2657.
91. Id. at 2656-57.
92. Id. at 2656.
93. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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sizes adaptation as a technique for obtaining compliance with
human rights treaties.94 Transnational advocacy networks are
made up of activists, who are distinguishable from other interna-
tional actors "by the centrality of principled ideas or values in
motivating" the formation of their networks.95 These networks
seek to change state behavior by framing "issues to make them
comprehensible to target audiences, to attract attention and en-
courage action, and to 'fit' with favorable institutional venues. '"96
These actors "bring new ideas, norms, and discourses into policy
debates, and serve as sources of information and testimony.' 9 7
Transnational advocacy networks use a variety of mechanisms to
achieve these ends, which include persuasion and pressure.9"
The bulk of the work that these networks do can be character-
ized as persuasion, but Keck and Sikkink contend that these
processes often involve "bringing pressure, arm-twisting, encour-
aging sanctions, and shaming."" Through the mechanisms of
persuasion and pressure the networks are able to exert influence
at five different levels: issue creation and agenda setting; the dis-
cursive positions of states and international organizations; insti-
tutional procedures; policy changes in "target actors"; and state
behavior."' The tactics utilized to be effective at these various
levels include information, accountability, leverage, and sym-
bolic politics. 1 Symbolic politics seek to make sense of a situa-
94. See KECK & SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS, supra note 81, at 3 (noting that transnational
advocacy networks "contribute to changing perceptions that both state and societal ac-
tors may have of their identities, interests, and preferences, to transforming their dis-
cursive positions, and ultimately to changing procedures, policies, and behavior.").
95. Id. at 1. Major actors in such networks often include international and domes-
tic nongovernmental research and advocacy organizations, local social movements,
foundations, churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, intellectuals, and mem-
bers of the executive or legislative branches of government. See id. at 9.
96. Id. at 2-3.
97. Id. at 3. Keck and Sikkink use the term norms to "describe collective expecta-
tions for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity. In some situations norms
operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus having 'constitutive effects'
that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognize a particular identity." Id.
(quoting Peter J. Katzenstein, Introduction, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY:
NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS 5 (PeterJ. Katzenstein ed., 1966)).
98. Across all strategies utilized "the stress is on changing discourses and practices"
as "these discourses and norms shape the way people think and make sense of their
world." Sikkink, Restructuring, supra note 81, at 306.
99. KECK & SIKKINK, AcrvIsTs, supra note 81, at 16.
100. Id. at 25. Target actors can include states, international organizations, or pri-
vate actors. Id.
101. Id. at 16. Information politics is about "quickly and credibly generat[ing]
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tion for a distant audience and strategic framing is an integral
aspect of symbolic politics.1"2 Keck and Sikkink's identification
of symbolic politics as a mechanism for influencing state behav-
ior demonstrates the potential of adaptation and strategic fram-
ing to change the social meanings attached to particular prac-
tices.
Goodman and Jinks similarly acknowledge the role of
norms, yet based on sociological institutionalism they claim that
states do not need to internalize the relevant norms. Rather
states just need to be acculturated.'0 3 Sociological institutional-
ism is the study of organizations and the effect of environment
on organizational structure. Empirical studies have found that
states display a high level of similarity in their organizational
structure-isomorphism.' l 4 In the case of human rights, iso-
morphism is seen in the widespread ratification of important
human rights treaties and the adoption of domestic legal provi-
sions that reinforce the treaty obligations. 10 5  For example,
CEDAW has been ratified in 185 countries10 6 and many of the
state parties have constitutional provisions providing equal pro-
tection on the basis of gender.'0 7
Sociological institutionalist scholars argue that the observed
similarities indicate that states are "constructions of a common
wider culture, rather than . . . self-directed actors responding
politically usable information and mov[ing] it to where it will have the most impact." Id.
Holding political actors to their commitments is the focus of accountability politics and
leverage politics uses powerful actors to assist less powerful members of the network. Id.
102. See id. at 16-17.
103. See Goodman & Jinks, Influence States, supra note 17, at 638-56. Sally Engle
Merry's research on a campaign for women's property inheritance rights in Hong Kong
found that individuals at the grass roots of a human rights movement do not have to
adopt a human rights consciousness. Despite a lack of deep or long-lasting commit-
ment to human rights approaches by local grassroots individuals, such a commitment
by middle-level women's groups and activists and transnational elites enabled human
rights approaches to be utilized effectively. See MERRY, supra note 71, at 192-217.
104. See Goodman &Jinks, Influence States, supra note 17, at 647.
105. See id. at 648.
106. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, State-
ment to Commemorate the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Adoption of the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Oct. 13, 2004),
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw25anniversary/state-
ment/CEDAW%20statement%20E.pdf.
107. See U.N. Div. for the Advancement of Women, Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: State Parties, http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2008).
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rationally to internal and external contingencies."' 08 The com-
mon wider culture is a global society culture that is comprised of
numerous models. The models provide the "cognitive and onto-
logical models of reality that specify the nature, purposes, tech-
nology, sovereignty, control, and resources of nation-states and
other actors."' 9 They outline the proper functioning of states,
societies, and individuals."o
Global cultural models are "constructed and propagated
through global cultural and associational processes.""' One of
the processes that has recently been highlighted in the legal
scholarship is that of acculturation.' 1 2 Acculturation refers to
the process by which actors adopt the "beliefs and behavioral
patterns of the surrounding culture.""'  Changes in behavior
are induced through social and cognitive pressure to assimi-
late." 4  Acculturation takes places through a number of
microprocesses, which include orthodoxy, mimicry, identifica-
tion, and status maximization and it "induces behavioral changes
not only by changing the target actor's incentive structure or
mind but also by changing the actor's social environment. ' a 5
States change their behavior in response to peer pressure.
Unlike persuasion, acculturation does not require states to ac-
cept the validity of the global cultural model beliefs, practices, or
norms. States need only perceive that an important reference
group, in this case certain components of the international com-
munity, holds the belief, accepts the norm, or takes part in the
practice." 6 States therefore focus more on their relationship
108. John W. Meyer et al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. Soc. 144, 152
(1997).
109. Id. at 149.
110. See id. These models "define and legitimate agendas for local action, shaping
the structures and policies of nation-states and other national and local actors in virtu-
ally all of the domains of rationalized social life-business, politics, education,
medicine, science, even the family and religion." Id. at 145. The models are based on
scientific, professional, and/or legal analysis that is highly rationalized and universalis-
tic. See id. at 149.
111. Id. at 144-45. For a detailed discussion of sociological institutionalism and its
applicability to states and international law, see generally id.; Goodman &Jinks, Interna-
tional Law, supra note 11.
112. See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, Influence States, supra note 17, at 638-56.
113. Id. at 626.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 638. See id. for a detailed discussion of each of these mechanisms of
acculturation.
116. See id. at 642-43.
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with the reference group than on the content of the relevant
rule or norm.' 17 This often gives rise to significant decoupling
between the structural features of the state and the state's poli-
cies on the one hand and the state's behavior on the other.118
Decoupling in sociological institutionalism is predicted." 9
Acculturation requires states to implement external cultural
models and it is difficult for states to import the models as a fully
functioning system that displaces their existing system.1 20 Fur-
thermore global culture is comprised of numerous models that
are, at times, inconsistent or contradictory. 121 Consequently,
states are able to adapt their structures and policies to satisfy par-
ticular global cultural models and simultaneously maintain con-
flicting practices that are supported by other models.
Decoupling does not, however, have to remain a permanent con-
dition. Goodman andJinks contend that the structural transfor-
mations undertaken by the state shift the state's political oppor-
tunity structure in ways that empower new actors and increase
the likelihood of a tighter connection between the state's actions
and its commitments. 122 Additionally, states learn over time
what constitutes compliance such that shallow reforms will cease
to bring about the desired social and cognitive benefits.1 23 The
civilizing force of hypocrisy is also identified as a tool for rectify-
117. Acculturation occurs not as a result of the content of the relevant rule or
norm but rather as a function of social structure-the relations between indi-
vidual actors and some reference group. Acculturation depends less on the
properties of the rule than on the properties of the relationship of the actor to
the community.
Id. at 643.
118. See Ryan Goodman & DerekJinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty,
55 STAN. L. REv. 1749, 1759-60 (2003) (discussing significant decoupling between the
constituent features of the state and the functional requirements and/or local values)
[hereinafter Goodman &Jinks, Institutional Theory]; Meyer et al., supra note 108, at 152.
To get the social benefits that acculturation provides, states generally only need to
make the structural changes because the benefits accrue without changes in actual
practices.
119. SeeJohn W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Struc-
ture as Myth and Ceremony, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
41, 57-58 (Walter W. Powell & PaulJ. DiMaggio eds., 1991); Goodman &Jinks, Institu-
tional Theory, supra note 118, at 1760-61; Meyer et al., supra note 108, at 154-56.
120. See Meyer et al., supra note 108, at 154.
121. Institutional environments are pluralistic, and at time inconsistent, which
causes "organizations in search of external support and stability [to] incorporate all
sorts of incompatible structural elements." Meyer & Rowan, supra note 119, at 56.
122. See Goodman & Jinks, International Law, supra note 11, at 995.
123. See id. at 996.
20091
804 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:781
ing decoupling.1
24
While Koh, Keck, and Sikkink focus on the need for persua-
sion, Goodman and Jinks argue that states can be socialized to
comply with their international legal obligations without inter-
nalizing the relevant global cultural model, in the case of
CEDAW, gender equality.125 These scholars disagree about the
need for states, state actors, and citizens to accept the validity or
legitimacy of the relevant norms. Yet they agree that states com-
ply with their international legal obligations when they accept
the legitimacy of the international obligations and norms, either
through internalization or acculturation. 126
B. Compliance Discourse
Within the last ten years gender equality has become an is-
sue of considerable importance internationally and CEDAW has
become a benchmark for assessing a state's commitment to this
issue. 127 Within the last ten years states within sub-Saharan Af-
rica have undertaken important legal reforms in the area of gen-
der equality. 21 Yet a notion persists that gender discrimination
abounds in this region of the world. Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries are often considered to be among the states with the worst
compliance records in the area of gender and human rights. 1 9
Through an examination of the CEDAW Committee's jurispru-
dence pertaining to sub-Saharan Africa it is possible to analyze
one treaty body's compliance discourse to determine how states
are directed to comply with their treaty obligations.13 1
124. See id. at 995.
125. See id. at 991-92; supra notes 84, 96 and accompanying text.
126. See Goodman &Jinks, International Law, supra note 11, at 991-92.
127. See generally U.N. Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advance-
ment of Women, Supporting Gender Mainstreaming: The Work of the Office of the Special
Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (Mar. 2001), available at http://
www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/report.pdf. The United Nations Development
Fund for Women ("UNIFEM") describes CEDAW as the "women's bill of rights," and
the "cornerstone of all UNIFEM programmes." U.N. Dev. Fund for Women, Key Docu-
ments, http://www.unifem.org/about/key-documents.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2008).
128. See generally The Road to Gender Equality in Africa: An Overview (Afr. Union
Comm'n, Addis Ababa, Eth.),July 6, 2004, available at http://www.africa-union.org/AU
%20summit%202004/gender/THE%20ROAD%20TO%20GENDER 2.pdf.
129. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Women's Rights in Middle East and North
Africa, http://humanrightswatch.net/women/overview-mena.html (last visited Nov. 30,
2008) (noting that sub-Saharan Africa ranked lowest in terms of women's participation
in economic, professional, and political life).
130. Treaty bodies are not the only entities within the international community
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Based on the CEDAW Committee's jurisprudence related to
sub-Saharan Africa between 1994 and 2007, the Committee's
compliance discourse falls into three categories: structural,
programmatic, and legal.' It is my contention that the CEDAW
that monitor treaty compliance. States, inter-governmental organizations, and non-gov-
ernmental organizations, domestic and international, are also involved in this activity
and states are cognizant of the opinions and judgments of these entities as well. See
supra note 37 and accompanying text.
131. The CEDAW Committee's concluding comments were systematically content
analyzed using Atlas.ti, a data analysis program. I analyzed the recommendations made
by the CEDAW Committee in each of the concluding comment reports for the sub-
Saharan African reports submitted between 1994 and 2007. First I developed broad
codes for the types of recommendations made and specific subcodes were identified
inductively. After coding an initial set of CEDAW Committee review reports, I devel-
oped a coding scheme that was applied to the entire set of CEDAW reviews.
Within sub-Saharan Africa forty-six states have ratified CEDAW. The two states that
have not ratified CEDAW are Somalia and Sudan. See U.S. Dept. of State, Countries and
Other Areas, http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2008) (listing forty-
eight states in sub-Saharan Africa); U.N. Division for the Advancement of Women, Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: State Par-
ties, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (last visited Nov. 30,
2008) (listing forty-six of the sub-Saharan states as parties to CEDAW).
Since 1990, the CEDAW Committee has considered thirty-four country reports. See
U.N. Division for the Advancement of Women, Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Country Reports, http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reports.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2008).
Of these thirty-four reports, thirty-three reports are accessible online. The missing
report is from Rwanda which was reviewed in 1993. See id. The analysis in this Article is
based on these thirty-three reports: 30-31st Sessions of CEDAW, supra note 5, pt. 2, It
124-71 [hereinafter Angola Comments]; 32nd and 33rd Sessions of the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,Jan. 10-28, 2005 and July 5-22, 2005,
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/60/
38 (2005) [hereinafter 32-33rd Sessions of CEDAW] pt. 2, 127-70 [hereinafter Benin
Comments]; id. pt. 2, It 315-58 [hereinafter Burkina Faso Comments]; 24th and 25th
Sessions of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Jan.
15-Feb. 2, 2001 and July 2-20, 2001, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (2001) pt. 1, 91 32-67 [hereinafter Burundi
Comments]; 22nd and 23rd Sessions of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation Against Women,Jan. 17-Feb. 4, 2000 andJune 12-30, 2000, Report of the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/55/38 (2000) pt. 2, 91
30-66 [hereinafter Cameroon Comments]; 34th, 35th, and 36th Sessions of the Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Jan. 16-Feb. 3, 2006, May
15-June 2, 2006, and Aug. 7-25, 2006, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/61/38 (2006) [hereinafter 34-36th Sessions of
CEDAW] pt. 3, 9 16-57 [hereinafter Cape Verde Comments]; 28th and 29th Sessions
of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Jan. 13-31,
2004 and June 30-July 18, 2004, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/58/38 (2004) [hereinafter 28-29th Sessions of CEDAW] pt.
1, 91 142-89 [hereinafter Congo Comments]; 34-36th Sessions of CEDAW, supra, pt. 3,
71 326-70 [hereinafter D.R.C. Comments]; 30-31st Sessions of CEDAW, supra note 5, pt.
2, 91 172-218 [hereinafter Equatorial Guinea Comments]; 34-36th Sessions of CEDAW,
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Committee overwhelmingly promotes programmatic reforms.
The Committee similarly emphasizes programmatic reforms to
address the adaptation aspects of domestic enforcement. In
2004, the Committee began to recognize the role that compo-
nents of the discursive opportunity structure play in facilitating
adaptation. That year the Committee recommended that state
parties collaborate with meaning-making entities, such as civil so-
ciety organizations like women's organizations, in preparing
awareness-raising campaigns to address CEDAW non-compliant
practices.13 2 Despite increasing recommendations to collaborate
supra, pt. 1, 71 61-99 [hereinafter Eritrea Comments]; 30-31st Sessions of CEDAW,
supra note 5, pt. 1, 11 226-73 [hereinafter Ethiopia Comments]; 32-33rd Sessions of
CEDAW, supra, pt. 1, 11 210-55 [hereinafter Gabon Comments]; 32-33rd Sessions of
CEDAW, supra, pt. 2, 19 171-220 [hereinafter Gambia Comments]; 34-36th Sessions of
CEDAW, supra, pt. 3, 9191 212-56 [hereinafter Ghana Comments]; 34-36th Sessions of
CEDAW, supra, pt. 2, 1 97-144 [hereinafter Guinea Comments]; 28-29th Sessions of
CEDAW, supra, pt. 1, 71 190-230 [hereinafter Kenya Comments]; 13th Session of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Jan. 17-Feb. 4, 1994,
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/49/
38 (1994) [hereinafter 13th Session of CEDAW] 91 186-244 [hereinafter Madagascar
Comments]; 34-36th Sessions of CEDAW, supra, pt. 2, 11 193-236 [hereinafter Malawi
Comments]; 34-36th Sessions of CEDAW, supra, pt. 1, 91 177-217 [hereinafter Mali
Comments]; 37th, 38th, and 39th Sessions of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, Jan. 15-Feb. 2, 2007, May 14-June 1, 2007, and July 23-
Aug. 10, 2007, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
U.N. Doc. A/62/38 (2007) [hereinafter 37-39th Sessions of CEDAW] pt. 2, 11 16-65
[hereinafter Mauritania Comments]; 34-36th Sessions of CEDAW, supra, pt. 3, 11 257-
94 [hereinafter Mauritius Comments]; 37-39th Sessions of CEDAW, supra, pt. 2, 11 156-
206 [hereinafter Mozambique Comments]; 16th and 17th Sessions of the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Jan. 13-31, 1997 and July 7-25,
1997, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc.
A/52/38/Rev.1 (1997) pt. 2, 17 69-131 [hereinafter Namibia Comments]; 37-39th Ses-
sions of CEDAW, supra, pt. 2, 1 207-49 [hereinafter Niger Comments]; 30-31st Sessions
of CEDAW, supra note 5, pt. 1, 11 274-316 [hereinafter Nigeria Comments]; 13th Ses-
sion of CEDAW, supra, 11 666-728 [hereinafter Senegal Comments]; 37-39th Sessions
of CEDAW, supra, pt. 2, 91 348-94 [hereinafter Sierra Leone Comments]; 18th and
19th Sessions of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Jan. 19-Feb. 6, 1998 and June 22-July 10, 1998, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/53/38/Rev.1 (1998) [hereinafter 18-19th
Sessions of CEDAW] pt. 2, 11 100-37 [hereinafter South Africa Comments]; id. 19 206-
42 [hereinafter Tanzania Comments]; 34-36th Sessions of CEDAW, supra, pt. 1, 11 140-
76 [hereinafter Togo Comments]; 26th, 27th, and Exceptional Sessions of the Commit-
tee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Jan. 14-Feb. 1, 2002, June 3-
21, 2002, and Aug. 5-23, 2002, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/57/38/Rev.1 (2002) pt. 3, 19 113-62 [hereinafter Uganda
Comments]; id. pt. 2, 11 211-61 [hereinafter Zambia Comments]; 18-19th Sessions of
CEDAW, supra, pt. 1, 11 120-66 [hereinafter Zimbabwe Comments].
132. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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with community leaders, the Committee has yet to identify offi-
cials within the customary legal system as potential collaboration
partners. Rather these individuals are identified as potential
targets for the awareness-raising campaign.
The CEDAW Committee's compliance discourse tracks the
three categories of obligations and commitments within CEDAW
itself: structural, programmatic, and legal.1 33 CEDAW is often re-
ferred to as the "women's bill of rights" since its primary goal is
the elimination of gender-based discrimination by creating
equal rights for men and women."3 Many of the CEDAW provi-
sions addressing the specific areas in which gender discrimina-
tion is to be eliminated require state parties to "take all appropri-
ate measures" to bring about the specified outcome."3 5 For a
smaller set of issues, CEDAW actually requires state parties to
adopt new laws.136 This requirement attaches to the elimination
of trafficking of women and child marriage.137 The CEDAW
Committee's report on its consideration of the state party re-
ports articulates which, if any, outcomes the state has successfully
achieved and provides recommendations for those that have yet
to be achieved. The recommendations offer strategies that will
assist the state in achieving the outcomes that demonstrate com-
pliance with the substantive obligations of CEDAW.
Structural reforms refer to political and legal structural
changes that are made within a state." Political and legal struc-
tural changes will often be in the form of changes to state institu-
133. See STEINER, ALSTON, & GOODMAN, supra note 21, at 185-87 (noting a differ-
ent, but related, typology for obligations within human rights treaties).
134. U.N. Dev. Fund for Women, Key Documents, http://www.unifem.org/about/
key-documents.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2008) (describing CEDAW). CEDAW defines
discrimination against women as:
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or ex-
ercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of
men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.
CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 1.
135. CEDAW, supra note 1, arts. 7, 10-16. Such outcomes include eliminating gen-
der discrimination in political and public life, education, employment, health care,
other areas of economic and social life, and marriage and family relations; and elimi-
nating discrimination against women in rural areas. See id.
136. Id. arts. 2(f), 3, 6, 16(2).
137. Id. arts. 6, 16(2).
138. This includes reforms that focus on procedural changes such as creating "an
accessible complaints procedure." Uganda Comments, supra note 131, 132. Struc-
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tions such as administrative agencies, government ministries, or
the judiciary.'39 For example, in many sub-Saharan African
states there is a cabinet-level ministry that focuses on gender is-
sues. 140 A common structural reform recommended by the
CEDAW Committee is to increase the "human and financial re-
sources" of such ministries.14' Programmatic reforms are
changes involving policy or program development. The devel-
opment of policies or programs may lay out substantive goals or
a procedural plan for developing substantive goals. For exam-
ple, Uganda adopted a National Action Plan on Women and a
National Gender Policy that "provide [s] guidelines for the devel-
opment of strategies and interventions for the empowerment of
women."' 4 2 Common CEDAW Committee programmatic recom-
mendations include inviting states to "increase [their] efforts to
design and implement comprehensive education and awareness-
raising programmes targeting women and men at all levels of
society," "implement measures to .. .retain girls in school," or
"undertake appropriate measures to improve women's access to
health care and health-related services and information.' 43 Fi-
nally, legal reforms are changes to a state's governing law-con-
stitutional, legislative, or administrative. For example, amend-
ments to Uganda's constitution provide for the recognition of
equality before the law and equal protection while legislative re-
forms guarantee inheritance rights for women.' 4 4 Examples of
the CEDAW Committee's legal recommendations include re-
questing states to revise their constitution or statutes to include
"a definition of discrimination in line with Article 1 of the Con-
vention, encompassing both direct and indirect discrimination,"
or to "adopt appropriate legislation for the implementation of
tural reforms also include calls for increased investment in the structural features of the
state. See, e.g., infra note 141 and accompanying text.
139. These recommendations often mirror the strategies and goals of technical
rule of law programs. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
140. Of the state parties examined, over half, 54.8%, of the states have ministerial
departments dedicated to gender issues and in 45.1% of the states the gender ministry
is a cabinet level ministry. Approximately one-third, 32.2%, of the states have adopted a
gender policy, and 16.1% of the states have adopted constitutional provisions imple-
menting CEDAW obligations.
141. See, e.g., Ghana Comments, supra note 131, 1 229.
142. Uganda Comments, supra note 131, 1 127.
143. See, e.g., Ghana Comments, supra note 131, 1 233, 239, 243.
144. UGANDA CONST. arts. 21, 33; Land Act § 39(1)(c)(i) (1998) (Uganda).
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each of the provisions of the Convention."' 45 Enforcement of
these and other legal reforms depends upon structural reforms.
For example, enforcing legal rights requires accessible dispute
resolution forums, like courts or tribunals and joint ownership
land titling reforms depend upon the existence of accessible
land registration offices.
The CEDAW Committee's compliance discourse does not
emphasize law and law enforcement as the primary basis for
bringing about gender equality. Rather there is a clear under-
standing that this goal requires legal as well as non-legal solu-
tions.14 6 A particularly prevalent non-legal solution deals with
what I refer to as adaptation. The Committee's recommenda-
tions are replete with comments regarding the need to change
public perceptions regarding gender norms, to change tradi-
tional cultural practices that are harmful to women, and to rec-
ognize that culture is dynamic.'47 This approach coincides with
specific CEDAW provisions. For example, Article 5(a) requires
state parties to:
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men
and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of
prejudices and customary and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either
of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and wo-
men ....148
The compliance discourse is replete with programmatic re-
145. Ghana Comments, supra note 131, 1 225. See, e.g., Congo Comments, supra
note 131, 11 175, 181; D.R.C. Comments, supra note 131, 11 347, 357; Equatorial
Guinea Comments, supra note 131, 192; Eritrea Comments, supra note 131, 1 67;
Gabon Comments, supra note 131, 1 232; Malawi Comments, supra note 131, 1 204.
146. The vast majority of the recommendations implore states to undertake com-
prehensive measures.
147. See, e.g., Angola Comments, supra note 131, 147; Benin Comments, supra
note 131, 1 148; Burkina Faso Comments, supra note 131, 1 342; Cameroon Comments,
supra note 131, 54; Cape Verde Comments, supra note 131, 33; D.R.C. Comments,
supra note 131, 353; Equatorial Guinea Comments, supra note 131, 196; Eritrea
Comments, supra note 131, 1 75; Ethiopia Comments, supra note 131, 252; Gabon
Comments, supra note 131, 240; Gambia Comments, supra note 131, 194; Ghana
Comments, supra note 131, 1 233; Kenya Comments, supra note 131, 210; Malawi
Comments, supra note 131, 212; Mali Comments, supra note 131, 194; Mauritania
Comments, supra note 131, 1 37; Mauritius Comments, supra note 131, 272;
Mozambique Comments, supra note 131, 1 176; Sierra Leone Comments, supra note
131, 1 368; Tanzania Comments, supra note 131, 230; Togo Comments, supra note
131, 1 154; Uganda Comments, supra note 131, 134.
148. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 5(a).
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forms to address this type of CEDAW obligation. Programmatic
reforms were the most prevalent within the Committee's compli-
ance discourse and structural reforms were the least frequent.
The vast majority of the programmatic recommendations im-
plored states to take "appropriate measures," or introduce,
adopt, implement, or put in place comprehensive measures to
actualize a CEDAW obligation.'49 The topics covered include lit-
eracy, violence against women, poverty, and health care. 150
Common examples include recommendations for the state to
"make the promotion of gender equality an explicit component
of all its national development strategies, policies and program-
mes";15 "place high priority on putting comprehensive measures
in place to address all forms of violence against women and girls,
recognizing that such violence constitutes a violation of the
human rights of women under the Convention and further elab-
orated in the Committee's general recommendation 19 on vio-
lence against women"; 52 and "to design and implement poverty
alleviation programmes so that women and girls do not have to
resort to prostitution for their livelihoods." '153 Most of the
programmatic recommendations were like those noted above-
very general in scope. The second most common type of
programmatic recommendation addressed awareness. 154 These
recommendations implored states to distribute information
about CEDAW obligations and norms. For example, the Com-
mittee requested that the state parties widely disseminate the
Committee's concluding comments to the public, government
officials, and local non-governmental organizations ("NGOs").1
149. See, e.g., Angola Comments, supra note 131, 153, 157; Congo Comments,
supra note 131, 171, 179; Eritrea Comments, supra note 131, 11 75, 83; Gabon Com-
ments, supra note 131, 236, 240; Gambia Comments, supra note 131, 190, 192,
194.
150. See, e.g., Equatorial Guinea Comments, supra note 131, 190, 194, 200, 204,
206; Ghana Comments, supra note 131, 235, 243, 245; Mali Comments, supra note
131, 196, 210, 212; Mozambique Comments, supra note 131, 180, 192, 198.
151. Angola Comments, supra note 131, 149.
152. Id. 9 153.
153. Cameroon Comments, supra note 131, 52.
154. Of the 838 programmatic recommendations, 20.5% addressed awareness.
155. The request was made in all CEDAW Committee reports issued after 1994. See,
e.g., Angola Comments, supra note 131, 1 171; Benin Comments, supra note 131, 1 169;
Burkina Faso Comments, supra note 131, 1 357; Burundi Comments, supra note 131,
67; Cameroon Comments, supra note 131, 66; Cape Verde Comments, supra note 131,
56; Congo Comments, supra note 131, 189; D.R.C. Comments, supra note 131, 1
369; Equatorial Guinea Comments, supra note 131, 46; Eritrea Comments, supra note
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Additionally, the Committee advised state parties to distribute
information to the public on topics of interest to the CEDAW
Committee like malnutrition, HIV/AIDS, early marriage, domes-
tic violence, education, and the importance of women's involve-
ment in leadership positions at all levels of decision-making. 156
Awareness recommendations were also prevalent among the
Committee's comments regarding adaptation. 1
Table 1.1: Programmatic Recommendations1 58
TYPE OF PROGRAMMATIC Frequency
RECOMMENDATION (n=838) PERCENTAGE
General 472 56.3
Awareness 172 20.5
Education 86 10.3
Culture 70 8.4
Implementation 38 4.5
Legal recommendations were the second most frequent
type made within the Committee's compliance discourse.
Within this category of recommendation, the Committee most
frequently implored states to enact specific legislation or ratify a
particular treaty. For example, the Committee encouraged Cape
Verde, Eritrea, and Sierra Leone to ratify the CEDAW Optional
131, 98; Ethiopia Comments, supra note 131, 273; Gabon Comments, supra note
131, 255; Gambia Comments, supra note 131, 219; Ghana Comments, supra note
131, 255; Guinea Comments, supra note 131, 144; Kenya Comments, supra note
131, 1 230; Malawi Comments, supra note 131, 235; Mali Comments, supra note 131,
216; Mauritania Comments, supra note 131, 64; Mauritius Comments, supra note 131,
293; Mozambique Comments, supra note 131, 205; Namibia Comments, supra note
131, 131; Niger Comments, supra note 131, 248; Nigeria Comments, supra note 131,
1 316; Sierra Leone Comments, supra note 131, 1 393; South Africa Comments, supra
note 131, 1 137; Tanzania Comments, supra note 131, 242; Togo Comments, supra
note 131, 1 175; Uganda Comments, supra note 131, 1 162; Zambia Comments, supra
note 131, 1 261; Zimbabwe Comments, supra note 131, 1 166.
156. See, e.g., Gambia Comments, supra note 131, 1 206 (malnutrition, malaria,
HIV/AIDS); id. 1 210 (early marriage); Guinea Comments, supra note 131, 1 133 (lead-
ership); Kenya Comments, supra note 131, 1 216 (leadership); Malawi Comments, supra
note 131, 1 218 (leadership); Mali Comments, supra note 131, 1 202 (leadership); Mau-
ritania Comments, supra note 131, 1 45 (domestic violence); Mauritius Comments,
supra note 131, 1 278 (leadership); Namibia Comments, supra note 131, 1 121 (domes-
tic violence); Niger Comments, supra note 131, 1 230 (domestic violence); Nigeria
Comments, supra note 131, 1 304 (education).
157. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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Protocol;159 Benin to ratify the International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families; 60 and Eritrea to ratify the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.'61 Other examples of the Committee's legal rec-
ommendations to enact specific legislation include the Commit-
tee urging Congo, South Africa, and Tanzania to incorporate
the definition of discrimination from article one of CEDAW
within domestic law,' 6 2 and recommending that Nigeria and
Togo adopt legislation on domestic violence, including marital
rape.163 The second most frequent legal recommendation was
for state parties to revise existing laws to bring them into compli-
ance with CEDAW. Examples include requests for state parties
to amend discriminatory nationality laws, civil and penal codes,
and marriage laws; remove inconsistencies between civil law and
customary law; and revise the state's constitution to include a
definition of discrimination.' 6 4 The Committee was also con-
cerned that state parties work to implement and enforce existing
law and the Convention more broadly,'65 that women have ac-
cess to legal institutions to make claims, 6 6 and that state parties
159. See Cape Verde Comments, supra note 131, 52; Eritrea Comments, supra
note 131, 93; Sierra Leone Comments, supra note 131, 389.
160. See Benin Comments, supra note 131, 168.
161. See Eritrea Comments, supra note 131, 97.
162. See Congo Comments, supra note 131, 159; South Africa Comments, supra
note 131, 116; Tanzania Comments, supra note 131, 1 227.
163. See Nigeria Comments, supra note 131, 1 298; Togo Comments, supra note
131, 1 158.
164. See, e.g., Congo Comments, supra note 131, 1 175, 181 (amend marriage laws
and laws prohibiting advertisement of contraceptives); D.R.C. Comments, supra note
131, 1 347, 357 (revise existing discriminatory laws); Equatorial Guinea Comments,
supra note 131, 1 192 (remove inconsistencies between civil law and customary law);
Eritrea Comments, supra note 131, 1 67 (reform Civil and Penal Codes); Gabon Com-
ments, supra note 131, 1 232 (revise Civil and Penal Codes); Malawi Comments, supra
note 131, 1 204 (revise Constitution to include definition of discrimination).
165. See, e.g., Burkina Faso Comments, supra note 131, 1 348; Ethiopia Comments,
supra note 131, 1 242; Gambia Comments, supra note 131, 1 198; Ghana Comments,
supra note 131, 1 241; Guinea Comments, supra note 131, 1 135; Malawi Comments,
supra note 131, 1 206; Mauritius Comments, supra note 131, 1 266; Nigeria Comments,
supra note 131, 1 296; Sierra Leone Comments, supra note 131, 1 372; Togo Com-
ments, supra note 131, 1 158.
166. See, e.g., Benin Comments, supra note 131, 1 150; Equatorial Guinea Com-
ments, supra note 131, 1 200; Gabon Comments, supra note 131, 1 230; Gambia Com-
ments, supra note 131, 1 194; Mali Comments, supra note 131, 1 192; Mauritania Com-
ments, supra note 131, 1 45; Mozambique Comments, supra note 131, 1 180; Niger
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work to increase citizens' knowledge and awareness of their legal
rights pursuant to CEDAW and existing domestic law.1 6 7
Table 1.2: Legal Recommendations168
TYPE OF LEGAL Frequency
RECOMMENDATION (n=410) PERCENTAGE
Enact 117 28.5
Review 86 21.0
General 79 19.3
Implement 74 18.0
Access 27 6.6
Awareness 22 5.4
Timeline 6 1.5
Fewer than twenty percent of the recommendations made
by the Committee dealt with structural reform. The vast major-
ity of the structural recommendations focused on political or le-
gal structural reforms and the need for state collaboration with
domestic stakeholders, domestic civil society organizations, and
IGOs.' 69 A significant number of these recommendations call
on state parties to increase the number of women in decision-
making positions and in elected and appointed political bod-
ies.1 7 ° Other recommendations included urging state parties to
include a gender perspective in the state's sectoral policies, 17 1
creating a family court,172 granting state courts sole jurisdiction
Comments, supra note 131, 1 220; Sierra Leone Comments, supra note 131, 1 372;
Uganda Comments, supra note 131, 132.
167. See, e.g., Angola Comments, supra note 131, 1 141; Burundi Comments, supra
note 131, 1 56; D.R.C. Comments, supra note 131, 337; Equatorial Guinea Comments,
supra note 131, 1 200; Gabon Comments, supra note 131, 1 232; Mauritania Comments,
supra note 131, 1 31; Mozambique Comments, supra note 131, 1 178; Namibia Com-
ments, supra note 131, 1 117; Niger Comments, supra note 131, 240; Nigeria Com-
ments, supra note 131, 1 296.
168. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
169. 51.1% of the recommendations were for structural collaboration and struc-
tural training.
170. See, e.g., Gabon Comments, supra note 131, 244; Gambia Comments, supra
note 131, 1 200; Guinea Comments, supra note 131, 133; Kenya Comments, supra
note 131, 1 216; Malawi Comments, supra note 131, 1 218; Mali Comments, supra note
131, 1 202; Mauritania Comments, supra note 131, 1 35; Mauritius Comments, supra
note 131, 1 278; Mozambique Comments, supra note 131, 1 184; Niger Comments,
supra note 131, 1 234.
171. See, e.g., Gabon Comments, supra note 131, 1 228.
172. See, e.g., Mauritius Comments, supra note 131, 1 288.
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for sexual violence cases,' 73 and increasing the number of wo-
men in the judiciary. 174 The Committee's recommendations ac-
knowledge the value of domestic allies in the context of political
and legal structural reforms, 175 yet this insight is not extended to
collaboration with customary legal officials for the adaptation
process.
Table 1.3: Structural Recommendations17
6
TYPE OF STRUCTURAL Frequency
RECOMMENDATION (n=268) PERCENTAGE
General 84 31.3
Collaboration 75 28.0
Training 62 23.1
Enforcement 32 11.9
Resources 15 5.6
Recommendations addressing adaptation appeared in all
three categories. Within the programmatic aspects of the com-
pliance discourse, adaptation was addressed through recommen-
dations for public awareness campaigns, curricular reform, and
education campaigns. The relevant structural reforms urged
states to provide professional training regarding CEDAW obliga-
tions. The professionals targeted were generally judges, lawyers,
law enforcement officers, and occasionally "tribal chiefs. 1 77
173. See, e.g., Namibia Comments, supra note 131, 120.
174. See, e.g., South Africa Comments, supra note 131, 130.
175. See, e.g., Benin Comments, supra note 131, 1156 (civil society to address liter-
acy); Burkina Faso Comments, supra note 131, 1 348 (international organizations and
donors to address development); Burundi Comments, supra note 131, 58 (interna-
tional assistance to address education); D.R.C. Comments, supra note 131, 1 359 (civil
society and international organizations to address literacy).
176. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
177. Angola Comments, supra note 131, 1 1.41; Benin Comments, supra note 131,
1 146; Cape Verde Comments, supra note 131, 1 35; D.R.C. Comments, supra note 131,
1 337; Eritrea Comments, supra note 131, 11 69, 77; Ethiopia Comments, supra note
131, 1 256; Equatorial Guinea Comments, supra note 131, 1 200; Gabon Comments,
supra note 131, 1 240; Gambia Comments, supra note 131, 1 192; Ghana Comments,
supra note 131, 9 233; Guinea Comments, supra note 131, 1 121; Kenya Comments,
supra note 131, 1 208; Malawi Comments, supra note 131, 1 212; Mali Comments, supra
note 131, 1 186; Mauritania Comments, supra note 131, 1 27; Mauritius Comments,
supra note 131, 1 278; Mozambique Comments, supra note 131, 1 178; Niger Com-
ments, supra note 131, 1 220; Tanzania Comments, supra note 131, 1 230; Togo Com-
ments, supra note 131, 1 154; Uganda Comments, supra note 131, 1 136; Zambia Com-
ments, supra note 131, 1 239.
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Amongst the legal recommendations, adaptation was addressed
through statements that state parties should work to change the
legal culture's perception of gender-related claims.'78
The most frequent adaptation recommendations were
within the programmatic category calling for increased aware-
ness. This aspect of the Committee's compliance discourse fo-
cused on using awareness-raising activities to challenge and
change discriminatory social and cultural patterns and to create
an environment to sustain such changes.'79 The Committee en-
couraged states to undertake awareness-oriented reforms in col-
laboration with civil society organizations, yet there was no men-
tion of the need to collaborate with officials within the custom-
ary legal systems."' For the many individuals throughout sub-
Saharan Africa who live in rural areas, the customary legal sys-
tem is the legal system that they are most likely to utilize. The
costs associated with bringing claims based on statutory law and
the distance parties have to travel to pursue their claims inhibit
many rural-based women from utilizing this legal system.' 8 '
Consequently, the customary legal system becomes the primary
resource for resolving claims and promoting rights. 8 2 The indi-
178. Angola Comments, supra note 131, 141; Eritrea Comments, supra note 131,
69; Gambia Comments, supra note 131, 192; Malawi Comments, supra note 131,
212; Mali Comments, supra note 131, 186; Mauritania Comments, supra note 131,
27; Mauritius Comments, supra note 131, 278; Niger Comments, supra note 131,
220; Nigeria Comments, supra note 131, 292; Togo Comments, supra note 131, 154.
179. Angola Comments, supra note 131, 147; Benin Comments, supra note 131,
148; Burkina Faso Comments, supra note 131, 342; Cameroon Comments, supra
note 131, 25; Cape Verde Comments, supra note 131, 33; D.R.C. Comments, supra
note 131, 353; Eritrea Comments, supra note 131, 75; Ethiopia Comments, supra
note 131, 252; Equatorial Guinea Comments, supra note 131, 196; Gabon Com-
ments, supra note 131, 240; Gambia Comments, supra note 131, 192; Ghana Com-
ments, supra note 131, 233; Kenya Comments, supra note 131, 210; Malawi Com-
ments, supra note 131, 212; Mali Comments, supra note 131, 186; Mauritania Com-
ments, supra note 131, 27; Mauritius Comments, supra note 131, 278; Mozambique
Comments, supra note 131, 178; Sierra Leone Comments, supra note 131, 370;
Tanzania Comments, supra note 131, 230; Togo Comments, supra note 131, 154;
Uganda Comments, supra note 131, 131.
180. See, e.g., D.R.C. Comments, supra note 131, 353; Equatorial Guinea Com-
ments, supra note 131, 196; Gambia Comments, supra note 131, 192; Ghana Com-
ments, supra note 131, 233; Malawi Comments, supra note 131, 212; Mali Com-
ments, supra note 131, 18; Mauritania Comments, supra note 131, 27; Togo Com-
ments, supra note 131, 154.
181. See Laurel L. Rose, Women's Land Access in Post-Conflict Rwanda: Bridging the
Gap Between Customary Land Law and Pending Land Legislation, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN & L.
197, 226 (2004).
182. Id. at 204, 220.
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viduals responsible for administering this system represent a sig-
nificant social institution within the community's discursive op-
portunity structure. These individuals, through their legal deci-
sions, establish boundaries that define normatively acceptable
customs and practices. As such, any framing regarding CEDAW
norms and obligations will have to address the complementary
and competing frames rooted in customary law. State collabora-
tion with these individuals enables the state to identify areas of
convergence and work within those spaces to create and deploy
locally relevant frames regarding CEDAW. While finding areas
of convergence will be challenging at times it can facilitate the
desired outcome as demonstrated by efforts to eliminate FGC in
Egypt.18
3
CEDAW recognizes the necessity of a polycentric system of
human rights protection. 1 4 The treaty obligations address struc-
tural, legal, and programmatic issues and the Committee sees
domestic enforcement as an important goal.185 To achieve that
goal the CEDAW Committee's adaptation recommendations
overwhelmingly address increasing awareness. The link between
increasing awareness through strategic framing and the role of
collaboration with meaning-making institutions in the success of
that project is only partially evidenced in the Committee's com-
pliance discourse. The Committee recommends that the state
parties collaborate with civil society organizations, but collabora-
tion with other key actors within the state's discursive opportu-
nity structure is not highlighted. A particularly noticeable omis-
sion is collaboration with officials within the customary legal sys-
tem. The cases discussed below, addressing women's property
rights in Uganda and Rwanda, highlight the role of customary
legal officials in shaping ideas regarding valid customs and prac-
tices within communities.
II. MARITAL PROPERTY IN RWANDA AND UGANDA
Land is the key resource in rural economies in sub-Saharan
Africa.' 86 States throughout this continent, with assistance from
183. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
184. Cf MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 209
(2007) (noting the necessary complexity of effective political institutions in the enforce-
ment of international law).
185. See supra notes 21, 139-45 and accompanying text.
186. Tripp, supra note 74, at 6.
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numerous international organizations, inter-governmental and
non-governmental, have explored the most effective systems for
regulating access to and ownership of land.187 Within the last
ten years Uganda, Rwanda, and other sub-Saharan African states
have revised their land tenure systems, and women's access to
and ownership of land have become prominent issues.' 88 The
key issues tied to women's access to and ownership of land have
been inheritance and default ownership rules for marital prop-
erty.
Women's relationship with land historically has been gov-
erned by customary rules and practices. There is significant de-
bate as to whether these rules and practices marginalize, protect,
or empower women. 89 Those who see customary rules and
187. Id. at 2; Gita Gopal, Gender-Related Legal Reform and Access to Economic
Resources in Eastern Africa, at vii (World Bank Discussion Paper No. 405, 1999).
188. Uganda, Tanzania, Zanzibar, Mozambique, Zambia, Eritrea, Namibia, and
South Africa enacted new land laws in the 1990s and Rwanda, Malawi, Lesotho,
Zimbabwe, and Swaziland adopted new land policies during this time period. See Tripp,
supra note 74, at 2. Women's access to land was an issue addressed during the land
reform debates in Zimbabwe, Malwai, Tanzania, Eritrea, Kenya, and Zambia. Id. at 3-4.
189. See, e.g., id. at 2, 10 (noting that women's organizations in Tanzania "could
not see any mechanism through which customary law would change, and saw instead
the changes in statutory laws as a basis for advocacy and reform."); Ann Whitehead &
Dzodzi Tsikata, Policy Discourses on Women's Land Rights in Sub-Saharan Afica: The Implica-
tions of the Re-turn to the Customary, 3 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 67, 94 (2003) ("The most
prevalent view is that customary systems enshrine male domination.").
As noted by Celestin Nyamu, there is an impression that:
women's rights do not exist in custom or local practice, and the solution there-
fore lies in substituting custom and local practice with alternatives offered by
national legislation or the international human rights regime.
Celestin I. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legi-
timization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 381, 393 (2000).
Gita Gopal, however, notes the dangers of focusing exclusively on the statutory
legal system:
Legal reform based on the above assumptions, however, has been largely un-
successful. The formal legal framework governing personal laws, which was
intended to replace or complement the traditional systems in many eastern
African countries, has not adequately safeguarded women's interests. On the
contrary, this paper argues that women have been adversely impacted by in-
sensitive, untimely, and piecemeal legal reform, reform that has led to the
imposition of alien norms that reflect a vision not shared by society as a whole.
New laws that have been implemented through centralized legal institutions
have further exacerbated the exclusion of women. The net result is that most
women continue to be governed by customary or religious laws and practices
which are stagnant, outdated, and constraining.
Gopal, supra note 187, at vii. See Rose, supra note 181, at 203, for a discussion of the
ways in which Rwandan women utilize customary law to enforce their land rights.
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practices as marginalizing adopt a rights-based approach to se-
curing women's access to land. As such, they seek constitutional
and legislative reforms guaranteeing women's access to and own-
ership of land. It is their contention that legal rights are the
only way to ensure that women's access to land is consistent and
reliable.19
The issue of married women's property rights is a matter
addressed within two international human rights treaties:
CEDAW and the African Protocol. Of the forty-eight states
within sub-Saharan Africa forty-six are state parties to CEDAW, 9'
which entered into force on September 3, 1981.192 The African
Protocol opened for ratification in July 2003 and entered into
force on November 25, 2005.193 As of November 2007, twenty-
two sub-Saharan African states have ratified the African Protocol
and another twenty-one states have signed it but not ratified it."'
In the area of married women's property rights the two trea-
ties protect different rights. CEDAW ensures that husbands and
wives have the same ownership, use, and disposition rights with
regard to property, while the African Protocol protects married
women's legal ability to own land and establishes specific base-
lines for property distribution when a marriage dissolves.
CEDAW states that:
State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to mar-
riage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a
190. See Tripp, supra note 74, at 3.
191. Sudan and Somalia are the two sub-Saharan African countries that have not
ratified CEDAW. See U.N. Div. for the Advancement of Women, Dep't of Econ. & Soc.
Affairs, States Parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women, States Parties, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/
states.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2008).
192. See U.N. Div. for the Advancement of Women, Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs,
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Short
History of CEDAW Convention, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/his-
tory.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2008).
193. Fareda Banda, Blazing a Trail: The African Protocol on Women's Rights Comes Into
Force, 50 J. AFR. L. 72 (2006).
194. The African Women's Development and Communication Network
("FEMNET"), African Union Marks Second Anniversary of African Protocol on the
Rights of Women, Nov. 26, 2007, available at http://www.femnet.or.ke/calendar.asp.
Somalia has signed, but not ratified, the African Protocol although it has not signed or
ratified CEDAW. The five sub-Saharan African states that have neither signed nor rati-
fied the African Protocol as of November 2007 are Botswana, the Central African Re-
public, Eritrea, Sao Tome & Principe, and the Sudan. Id.
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basis of equality of men and women: . . . [t]he same rights for
both spouses with respect to the ownership, acquisition, man-
agement, administration, enjoyment and disposition of prop-
erty, whether free of charge or for a valuable considera-
tion. t9
5
State parties to the African Protocol are required to, "enact ap-
propriate national legislative measures to guarantee that... dur-
ing her marriage, a woman shall have the right to acquire her
own property and to administer and manage it freely." '96 This
provision does not speak to the ownership of marital property as
between husbands and wives, it merely ensures that state parties
do not have coverture rules.19 7 CEDAW addresses this issue of
married women's legal capacity by requiring state parties to ac-
cord to women,
in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that of men and
the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In particu-
lar, they shall give women equal rights to conclude contracts
and to administer property and shall treat them equally in all
stages of procedure in courts and tribunals.' 98
In addressing the position of women whose marriage has been
dissolved in the form of divorce, separation, or annulment,'99
the African Protocol requires state parties to:
enact appropriate legislation to ensure that women and men
enjoy the same rights in case of separation, divorce or annul-
ment of marriage. In this regard, they shall ensure that .. in
case of separation, divorce or annulment of marriage, women
195. Id. art. 16(1)(h) (emphasis added).
196. African Protocol, supra note 2, art. 6(10).
197. Coverture rules under American and British law eliminated the separate legal
existence of married women. Husbands and wives were treated as one legal entity such
that married women could not own or control the disposition of property. As William
Blackstone noted,
[b]y marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at
least incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose
wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything; and is therefore called
... a feme-covet ... ; is said to be covert-baron, or under the protection and
influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her
marriage is called her coverture.
I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 442.
198. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 15(2).
199. It is not clear if this provision only applies to married couples who have a
legal separation or all married couples who are no longer living together as a married
couple.
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and men shall have the right to an equitable sharing of the joint
property deriving from the marriage. 200
In addition to addressing married women's property rights, the
African Protocol addresses inheritance. The African Protocol
states that:
(1) A widow shall have the right to an equitable share in the
inheritance of the property of her husband. A widow shall
have the right to continue to live in the matrimonial house.
In case of remarriage, she shall retain this right if the house
belongs to her or she has inherited it. (2) Women and men
shall have the right to inherit, in equitable shares, their par-
ents' properties. 201
While the CEDAW Committee does not review a state's com-
pliance with other treaties, it is clear that this is an issue that has
become a matter of international concern. The default rules re-
garding the ownership of marital property are critical for provid-
ing married women with security.20 2 Land is the resource from
which the majority of individuals living in Uganda and Rwanda
depend upon for their livelihood. Women's lack of ownership
rights in this property leaves them vulnerable to the whims of
their husbands and male relatives, which can be devastating
when marriages disintegrate.20 3
A. Seeking Co-Ownership in Uganda
Land reform became a significant issue during Uganda's
constitutional review process in the early to mid-1990s. 20 4 The
constitutional conference was unable to reach a satisfactory reso-
lution of the various issues involved in land reform so the matter
was postponed. 205 The 1995 Constitution required Parliament
200. African Protocol, supra note 2, art. 7 (emphasis added). The wording of this
provision was changed from the 2001 draft, which gave men and women the same right
to marital property. Banda, supra note 193, at 77.
201. African Protocol, supra note 2, art. 21.
202. Marital property refers to real property that forms the basis for a family's
subsistence in rural areas.
203. See, e.g., Uganda Land Alliance, Biting the Feeding Hand: Voices of Women
on Land (2006), available at http://www.cwlr.net/publications/others/resources/wo-
men-and-land-uganda.pdf/download.
204. This process culminated with the adoption of a new constitution in 1995.
205. There are four land tenure systems in Uganda: freehold, leasehold, mailo,
and customary tenure. Freehold tenure is ownership of land that is registered and the
registered owner has full ownership rights. Under leasehold tenure an individual leases
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to enact a law "regulating the relationship between the lawful or
bona fide occupants" of mailo, freehold or leasehold land, and
"providing for the acquisition of registrable interest in the land
by the occupant. "206 As the country embarked upon the process
of enacting national legislation to reform the land tenure sys-
tem, women's organizations found an opportunity to have issues
related to land and gender addressed.
Women's organizations in Uganda utilized a rights-based
approach for addressing women's access to and ownership of
land. The dominant land tenure system in Uganda is customary
tenure, which is governed by customary law. These organiza-
tions adopted a strategy that sought to obtain formal legal rights
within the state's statutory legal system that would prevail over
contrary customary rules and practices. The decision to pursue
statutory rather than customary reform was based on the belief
that customary law is used to justify practices and rules that
subordinate women.2 °7 There was significant concern that seek-
the land for a specified period of time pursuant to specific conditions. Mailo land ten-
ure "involves holding registered land in perpetuity." Tripp, supra note 74, at 5. Finally,
customary tenure is a system governed by customary law and the leaders of a particular
clan or ethnic group administer it. Id.
In 1975, the Land Reform Decree eliminated two long utilized forms of land ten-
ure, mailo lands and freeholds. The mailo land tenure system was introduced by the
British in 1900 in the Uganda Agreement. Mailo lands were quasi-freehold in that there
were limitations as to whom mailo owners could sell their land, the law specified the
relationship between the mailo owners and the tenants on their land, and the 1967
constitution, "vested ownership of, and control over, all minerals and water on mailo
lands in the state." Winnie Bikaako &John Ssenkumba, Gender, Land and Rights: Contem-
porary Contestations in Law, Policy and Practice in Uganda, in WOMEN AND LAND IN AFRICA:
CULTURE, RELIGION, AND REALIZING WOMEN'S RIGHTS 232, 236 (L. Muthoni Wanyeki ed.,
2003). Mailo owners obtained the most desirable land while the less fertile land be-
came Crown land.
The mailo and freehold land tenure systems were formally replaced with lease-
holds. Yet in practice these systems continued to exist with a few modifications. Te-
nants no longer paid the busuulu (ground rent) or envujo (commodity rent). Id. at 239.
The 1995 constitution meant to determine the relationship between the mailo land
holders and the tenants or bona fide occupants of that land. This issue was not resolved
when the constitution was adopted, rather the constitution required the adoption of a
new land law within two years after the first Parliament elected under the 1995 constitu-
tion. UGANDA CONST. art. 237(9) (1995).
206. UGANDA CONST. art. 237(9) (1995).
207. Tripp, supra note 74, at 1, 2; Jacqueline Asiimwe, Women and the Struggle for
Land in Uganda, in THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN UGANDA: HISTORY, CHALLENGES, AND
PROSPECTS 119, 124 (Aili Mar Tripp &Joy C. Kwesiga eds., 2002) ("Since customary law
is not codified, men are able to manipulate it to suit their desires and have used it to
justify the distinctions and/or discrimination between men and women."). In response
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ing reform within the customary legal system would not produce
consistent and reliable rights for women.2"8 As land has become
more scarce and commercialized,
local leaders have felt mounting pressures to protect the clan
system, and in so doing have placed even greater constraints
on women's access to land. However, the clan system they are
seeking to preserve is no longer one that affords women the
supports it is once said to have guaranteed.2" 9
Customary law dates back to pre-colonialism.2 ° It was the
legal system used within specific ethnic communities and the le-
gal rules are administered by authority figures within the ethnic
group, such as chiefs. Despite the ancient roots of customary
law, these legal systems, like statutory systems, are dynamic and
change over time to address shifts in social circumstances. Cus-
tomary legal systems vary by ethnic group, but the land tenure
system discussed below is representative of those operating
within Uganda.
Customary land tenure provides for both individual and
communal ownership."' Inheritance is the most common
method by which land is passed from one individual to another
and patrilineal succession is the norm.212 There are, however,
to a 2003 World Bank report advocating the localization of land administration, Ange-
lique Haugerud noted that:
rhetoric about empowering local institutions to administer "customary" land
law risks romanticizing or essentialing "community" and "customary" law, as-
suming the internal politics and hierarchies in communities to be benign, and
overlooking potentially inflammatory identity politics and the sometimes
deeply conservative or even reactionary tendencies local communities may
contain.
Tripp, supra note 74, at 16.
208. Another scholar working in the area of women's rights in Uganda has noted
that:
The women's movement is articulating a vision of land tenure and gender
relations that challenge the fantasy that customary arrangements can ade-
quately protect the welfare of women in the way that they are once said to have
done. This is no longer the reality for many women, who are trying to find
more secure and less arbitrary means of building their lives.
Tripp, supra note 74, at 15.
209. Id. at 2; see infra note 279 and accompanying text, for a discussion of similar
concerns in Rwanda.
210. Tripp, supra note 74, at 5.
211. Id. Ownership within customary land tenure systems does not require titling
or registration.
212. Patrilineal descent is "characterized by male control of decision-making about
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exceptional circumstances under which daughters can inherit
from their fathers. These circumstances exist when there is no
suitable male heir or when the father dies intestate. 3 When
women are the beneficiaries of a land inheritance the portion
they receive is typically significantly less than the portion their
brothers or other male relatives receive. 214 Women are also able
to inherit land as a trustee for a male relative.215  Typically
mothers will inherit land on behalf of their minor sons. Once
the sons reach the age of majority they obtain sole ownership. 6
Another means by which women gain access to land is
through family gifts and marriage. Customary law does not pro-
hibit families from giving land to female family members. How-
ever, women who obtain these gifts are not permitted to alienate
the property.217 The right of disposition stays with the male
head of the family or kinship group.218 Married women are
granted usufructuary rights to the land owned by their hus-
bands.2 9 Upon marriage, a husband would assign a particular
segment of land to his wife for her to cultivate for the family's
needs. 22 0  In some instances women are also allowed to ex-
change or sell any surplus goods cultivated. 22 1 Both of these ave-
nues of access to land limit women to usufructuary rights.
2 22
Pre-colonialism women had rather secure user rights to land. As
family heads, which were predominately male, obtained greater
who will inherit and administer the estate, and preference for male over female heirs."
Asiimwe, supra note 207, at 123.
213. Jacqueline Asiimwe, Making Women's Land Rights a Reality in Uganda: Advocacy
for Co-Ownership by Spouses, 4 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. LJ. 171, 175-76 (2001).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Asiimwe, supra note 207, at 123-24 (citing JENNIFER OKUMU WENGI, WEEDING
THE MILLET FIELD: WOMEN'S LAW AND GRASSROOTS JUSTICE IN UGANDA (1997)).
217. Asiimwe, supra note 207, at 123-24.
218. Bikaako & Ssenkumba, supra note 205, at 239. Yet historically in at least one
region of Uganda property rights were organized around "relatively autonomous, fe-
male-headed households." Lynn Khadiagala, Negotiating Law and Custom: Judicial Doc-
trine and Women's Property Rights in Uganda, 46 J. AFR. L. 1 (2002). Customary legal
officials "upheld women's right to control property to the exclusion of husbands and
co-wives. Men who sought to sell a wife's land or transfer parcels among co-wives re-
ceived sharp rebukes from the courts." Id.
219. Bikaako & Ssenkumba, supra note 205, at 242.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Women's land rights were limited to use, they did not hold rights that ena-
bled them to control the disposition of land. Id. at 240.
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autonomy in making decisions regarding access, use, and con-
trol of land, women's land rights became less secure. The in-
creased autonomy limited the need for family heads to consult
with the larger family or community regarding the disposition of
land. Land scarcity similarly reduced women's land security
within the customary land tenure system. As less land was availa-
ble to distribute, women's secondary user rights were often ig-
nored in order to ensure that men's primary ownership rights
were satisfied.
Statutory law in Uganda does not prohibit women from
owning land, but its permissiveness often conflicts with the appli-
cable customary law. Uganda, like many sub-Saharan African
countries, has a dual legal system comprising of customary and
statutory law. The regulation of land ownership and inheritance
is one area that is regulated by both legal systems. Pursuant to
the 1998 Land Act, statutory law takes precedence over conflict-
ing customary law regarding women's rights, yet statutory law is
not utilized to a great degree in rural communities. 22' The so-
cial and cultural dominance of the customary property system
has significantly limited women's land access and ownership
rights. 224 The desire for statutory law to explicitly grant inheri-
tance rights to women and girls and co-ownership rights to mar-
ried women was the primary goal of women's organizations in
Uganda.225
In 1999 and 2000 it was reported that women in Uganda
provided over seventy percent of the labor in agricultural pro-
duction and over eighty percent of the labor in food crop pro-
duction and processing.2 2 6 Yet the majority of Ugandan women
did not own land and ninety-three percent of women had only
usufruct or usage rights to land. 227 The 1998 Land Act was the
223. Land Act, No. 16, § 27 (1998) (Uganda), available at http://faolex.fao.org/
docs/pdf/uga19682.pdf.
224. Asiimwe, supra note 207, at 122 (noting that the Ministry of Gender, Labour
and Social Development has reported that "social and cultural realities" effectively deny
them this right). A significant barrier to female land ownership has been the socio-
economic position of women generally. Illiteracy rates for women are higher than
those for men, 55.1% compared to 36.5%. This is tied to limited educational opportu-
nities that women have experienced in Uganda. Primary school enrollment is fifty-five
percent boys and forty-five percent women, but that figure drops significantly at the
university level. There women make up thirty-five percent of the student body. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 119.
227. Id.; Tripp, supra note 74, at 6.
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target for reform. Women's organizations lobbied for women's
land rights in general, but a key reform proposal was a provision
that would allow married men and women to co-own family or
marital property. 228 The co-ownership clause, as it became
known, was discussed, debated, and approved by Parliament. Yet
when the final act was passed the co-ownership clause was miss-
ing.229 Procedural reasons were offered by the Government as to
why the clause was omitted from the Land Act, yet many within
the women's organizations felt betrayed by what was seen as an
invalid presidential line item veto. 230 Years later, President
Museveni admitted that "[w]hen I learnt that the Bill was em-
powering the newly-married women to share the properties of
the husbands, I smelt a disaster and advised for slow and careful
analysis of the property sharing issue. '23 1 President Museveni
stated that it was better to have this matter addressed in the
then-pending (and still pending) Domestic Relations Bill.23 2 Ac-
tivists supporting the co-ownership clause saw the President's
move as an unconstitutional interference with the legislative pro-
cess. If the clause was to be moved it should have been done by
Parliament.233
Uganda's women's organizations utilized a multifaceted ap-
proach for obtaining legal reform. These organizations
partnered with land reform organizations, such as the Uganda
Land Alliance; networked with women in Parliament, develop-
ment agencies, gender-related NGOs, non-gender-related NGOs,
the civil service, the media, and academia; raised the co-owner-
228. Asiimwe, supra note 207, at 121; Tripp, supra note 74, at 6.
229. Asiimwe, supra note 207, at 121; Tripp, supra note 74, at 7.
230. See, e.g., Asiimwe, supra note 207, at 121.
231. Share Parent's Property, Museveni Tells Women, NEW VISION (May 10, 2000). Aili
Mari Tripp notes, "[i] t was believed that the president's decision to shift the clause to
the DRB [Domestic Relations Bill] was intended to save face so that the government
would not appear anti-woman. But the effect would be to remove the issue from the
agenda altogether." Tripp, supra note 74, at 7.
232. Tripp, supra note 74, at 7. The DRB was controversial in the late 1990s and it
has yet to become law. The leader of the Uganda Land Alliance, Jacqueline Asiimwe in
explaining why the DRB was, and remains to be, controversial noted that:
The DRB is already riddled with controversy over marital rape, regulation of
polygamy, declaring the payment of bride price as no longer necessary in con-
tracting a customary marriage, even the age of marriage ... and so we saw it as
dangerous to add another clause that in essence would lock debate on the
whole bill.
233. Id.
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ship issue in public forums organized by other interest groups,
lawyers, development agencies, political groups, and themselves;
produced and circulated materials for members of Parliament
and other key actors;2 3 4 and lobbied members of Parliament and
the sessional committee responsible for the Land Bill.23
While the co-ownership clause failed to make the final act,
other provisions aimed at providing and protecting women's
land rights were included. For example, the Land Act requires
prior written consent by both spouses for all transactions involv-
ing family holdings.23 6 Secondly, the 1988 Land Act voids any
decision regarding customary land that denies "women or chil-
dren or persons with disability access to ownership, occupation
or use of any land or imposes conditions which violate" the Con-
stitution. 237 Finally, provisions were included in the 1998 Land
Act requiring the various land management bodies to have fe-
male representatives.238 In 2003 the Land Act was amended and
234. Uganda Association of Women Lawyers ("FIDA-Uganda") produced "Land
Briefs," which provided summaries of the members of Parliament's views on the pro-
posed Land Bill and the Uganda Women's Network ("UWONET") produced a publica-
tion expressing its position regarding the Land Bill. Asiimwe, supra note 207, at 125.
235. Id. This strategy of obtaining influential allies and mobilizing was successful
for gender equity advocates in Rwanda during the constitution-making process. During
the constitution-making process gender equity advocates obtained influential allies do-
mestically in the form of government officials and a member of the constitutional com-
mission and internationally from UNIFEM and states such as the United Kingdom and
the United Sstates. They also embarked on a mobilizing campaign in which they
sought to gain the support of women and men throughout the country for their pro-
posed constitutional reforms. Another key aspect of their strategy was framing their
proposals as being consistent with the goals and interests of Rwanda's political elite.
The gender equity advocates in Rwanda were able to frame the need for gender equal-
ity-based constitutional reforms as a necessary prerequisite for unity and reconciliation,
which was the frame utilized by the executive officials in the constitution-making pro-
cess. Banks, supra note 59, at 153-60.
236. Land Act, No. 16, § 40(1) (c) (i) (1998) (Uganda), available at http://
faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/uga19682.pdf. Family holdings are defined as "land on which
a person ordinarily resides with his or her spouse, and from which they derive their
sustenance." Id.
237. Id. § 28. In full this Article states,
Any decision taken in respect of land held under customary tenure, whether
in respect of land held individually or communally shall be in accordance with
the custom, traditions and practices of the community, concerned; except that
a decision which denies women or children or persons with disability access to
ownership, occupation or use of any land or imposes conditions which violate
articles 33, 34 and 35 of the Constitution on any ownership, occupation or use
of any land shall be null and void.
Id.
238. One of the five members of the Uganda Land Commission must be a woman,
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women's organizations used this opportunity to seek inclusion of
a co-ownership clause again.239 These efforts were similarly un-
successful despite extensive lobbying efforts.2 4 °
Advocates for co-ownership in Uganda developed alliances
with other aspects of Ugandan civil society. Unlike in Rwanda,
the government did not actively support reform for co-owner-
ship. Despite success within Parliament, the President shared
the concerns raised by local elites who opposed co-ownership.
The frame created and deployed by the co-ownership advocates
focused on equality and fairness, but within Parliament the most
frequent frame utilized to support co-ownership was protec-
tion.241' Advocates emphasized women's equal contribution to
the household, the need for women to be treated equally, and
the need for fairness.24 2 Opponents advanced a family preserva-
tion frame that presented co-ownership as destabilizing because
it would challenge traditional gender roles within the family.
The co-ownership supporters within Parliament similarly called
upon traditional gender roles, but they emphasized the duty to
protect vulnerable portions of the population. The overwhelm-
ing emphasis on patriarchal norms by non-advocates suggests
that the equality frame did not resonate within Parliament de-
spite its prevalence within the public discourse. 243 Advocates
were unsuccessful in both the adoption and adaptation process,
although the state bears responsibility for the lack of adop-
one-third of the District Land Boards and Communal Land Associations must be wo-
men, and one of the four members of each of the local Land Committees must be a
woman. Id. §§ 48(4), 58(3), 17(4)(b), 66(2).
239. Tripp, supra note 74, at 5.
240. Id.
241. These figures are based on an analysis of Uganda Parliamentary debates be-
tween July 16, 2002 and June 18, 2003 and newspaper articles available through Al-
1Africa.com between July 16, 1997 and July 26, 2003. The Parliamentary debates are
from the time period in which Parliament was amending the 1998 Land Act and the
newspaper articles are from the years when the 1998 Land Act was initially considered
in Parliament and the subsequent amendments.
242. Tripp, supra note 74, at 10.
243. The equality frame was the most frequently used frame in the newspaper arti-
cles. As noted by Merry, human rights norms often challenge existing distributions of
power. CEDAW challenges patriarchy and utilizing an equality frame was a strategy for
presenting women as valuable human beings entitled to particular rights. The discur-
sive benefits of advancing that frame may have outweighed the strategic benefits of
developing a frame that incorporated patriarchal norms and addressed concerns re-
garding family instability.
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tion.24 4 The Uganda case demonstrates the difficulty of success-
ful adaptation absent broad collaboration; and despite govern-
ment support and a successful adoption process, the Rwanda
case illustrates the challenge of adaptation without sufficient col-
laboration or participation by local elites.
B. Obtaining Co-Ownership in Rwanda
Rwanda, like Uganda, has a plural legal system and land is a
topic that is governed by both customary law and statutory law.24 5
As a result of the civil war and genocide that took place in
244. Specifically since the Land Bill that passed Parliament included the co-owner-
ship clause.
245. The statutory law stems from the legal system implemented by Belgium dur-
ing its colonial rule of Rwanda. See Rose, supra note 181, at 203; see alsoJennie E. Burnet
& the Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Dev., Culture, Practice and Law: Women's Access to
Land in Rwanda, in WOMEN AND LAND IN AFRICA: CULTURE, RELIGION AND REALIZING
WOMEN'S RIGHTS 176, 180-82 (L. Muthoni Wanyeki ed., 2003) [hereinafter Burnet &
RISD]. The statutory regulation of land that was implemented created land titles, how-
ever these titles were generally only available to foreigners. Titled property was only
available to the civilis6, and few Africans could prove that they met the standard. Id. at
181. Civilisi was legally defined as "any non-European who lived in a Western-style
house, wore Western clothes, [and] ate Western food with Western utensils." Id. at 180
n.5. Pre-colonial Rwanda had two land tenure systems: ubukonde operating in the north
and northwest and igikingi governing in the central, eastern, and southern portions of
the state. Id. at 179. Within the ubukonde system individuals gained access to land by
being the first to clear the land and "valorize" it. Rights to such land were held by a
lineage and significant management decisions were made by the lineage chief. The
lineages maintained economic and political power over their land and used a system of
clientship to grant use rights. Id. at 180. Clients had to make payments, generally a
portion of their harvest or manual labor, to their patrons. Within the igikingi system
land was distributed by the mwami, the political and spiritual leader of the central
Rwandan kingdom, or his chiefs. Id. at 180, 180 n.4. The land that was distributed
consisted of large tracts of land for grazing cattle. This type of land was an important
resource for the pastoralist populations in the central and southern portions of the
country. Id. at 180. The mwami distributed land to war heroes and other highly valued
individuals within the society. Id. Holders of land within the igikingi system could lose
their land if they lost the favor of the chief or if they lost their cattle due to disease,
mismanagement, or raiding. Those who obtained land within the igikingi system were
expected to make regular gifts to the mwami or the chief. As in the ubukonde system, a
common gift was providing labor to work at the home of the chief or mwami. Other
types of gifts included cattle, honey, and milk. Id. Those with igikingi land had the
power to partition it and give plots to other individuals to cultivate. These individuals
became clients who would provide seasonal gifts and labor to the igikingi landholder.
Id. Political and economic power shifted during colonialism and the land tenure sys-
tems changed as well. In the 1960s during the transition from colonial rule to indepen-
dence, these traditional land tenure systems were abolished. Igikingi land was placed in
the hands of communal authorities and individual ownership rights were given to those
holding ubukonde land. Id. at 182.
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Rwanda in the early 1990s the state's customary legal system was
"rendered barely functional, if not obsolete. 246 Consequently,
during Rwanda's reconstruction customary legal practices were
recreated as individuals making and adjudicating claims found
the customary legal system unable to effectively address the ex-
isting disputes. For example, after the war refugees began re-
turning to Rwanda. The returning refugees included both old
and new caseload refugees. Old caseload refugees refer to
Rwandans that left the country more than ten years before the
early 1990s war and genocide. These individuals typically left
Rwanda between 1959 and 1962. New caseload refugees were
the individuals who left Rwanda in the early 1990s. 24 7 New rules
had to be devised to determine who would get to settle on what
land, what type of settlement permit would be issued to return-
ees, and what, if any, costs would be charged for land administra-
tion. 2 4 8
Within the customary land tenure systems as they currently
operate, men-fathers, husbands, or male children-guarantee
women's access to and ownership of land. Land is generally in-
herited patrilineally and land held by the lineage is divided to
provide each male descendant a plot of land to build a house
and fields to cultivate.249 Married women obtain automatic ac-
cess to their husband's fields for cultivation purposes. 25 0 Wo-
men do not have a right to inherit ownership rights from their
fathers or their husbands and they have limited rights regarding
the management and disposition of property to which they have
access. 251 When a husband dies women are entitled to retain
usufructuary rights to the husband's land and to remain in the
matrimonial home.25 2 Women hold the land and the home in
trust for the male heirs who will inherit based on patrilineal in-
heritance.253 If a woman does not have children, her access to
the marital land and home depends upon the goodwill of her in-
246. Rose, supra note 181, at 204.
247. Id. at 206.
248. Id. at 206.
249. Burnet & RISD, supra note 245, at 187.
250. Id.
251. Fathers could bestow gifts of land upon their daughters or they could inherit
if they had no brothers. Id. at 210; Rose, supra note 181, at 209.
252. Burnet & RISD, supra note 245, at 187.
253. Id.; Rose, supra note 181, at 209.
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laws. 25 4 A woman's land rights under Rwanda's pre-genocide
customary system, as under Uganda's customary rules, were con-
tingent upon her status as a wife, mother, daughter, or sister.
The majority of the population in Rwanda lives in rural ar-
eas and most individuals obtain land through inheritance, land
grant, loan, or sale.255 While the sale of customary land is pro-
hibited, it has become increasingly common as land fragmenta-
tion has become more severe.2 5 6 In the new resettlement vil-
lages created after the war and genocide, local authorities were
responsible for allocating land plots. Established villages were
faced with determining how to allocate land amongst returning
refugees. Local authorities were responsible for organizing land-
sharing arrangements to address this issue. 257 When individuals
have land disputes they are to exhaust local remedies before
seeking redress in the formal court system.258 The first level of
review is with the extended family, then the cell, and finally the
sector.259 These forums for review do not utilize courts, but
rather traditional gacaca.260 The majority of disputes are ad-
dressed at this level, but access to financial resources, education
level, and social connections affect whether or not women pur-
sue their claims within the court system applying statutory law.2 61
In 1996, the Ministry of Gender, Family and Social Affairs
introduced a draft bill on inheritance and marital property re-
254. Burnet & RISD, supra note 245, at 187; Rose, supra note 181, at 209-10.
255. Ninety-one percent of the Rwandan population depends upon agricultural
for their livelihood. Burnet & RISD, supra note 245, at 176.
256. Rose, supra note 181, at 208. Land fragmentation refers to the diminishing
size of land plots available for inheritance. It is occurring because "males were increas-
ingly inheriting land as a right," which led to "the incessant subdivisions of land to
satisfy the claims of sons. With each passing generation, a family's landholding was
increasingly fragmented." Id. By 1986, smallholder families had an average farm size of
1.2 hectare. The average family size in Rwanda included four sons, meaning that each
son could expect to inherit 0.3 hectare. A household of four persons is reported to
need from one to two hectare to satisfy basic subsistence needs. Id. Between 1960 and
2001 the average size of a family farm plot decreased from two hectare to 0.5 hectare.
Id.
257. Rose, supra note 181, at 205.
258. Under the post 2003 structure, the relevant courts would be the District
courts, Provincial Courts, and the Cassation Court. Id.
259. Id.
260. In 2001, the Rwandan government implemented the Gacaca Law for geno-
cide, which created new gacaca courts to adjudicate claims related to genocide. These
modern forms of gacaca exist simultaneously with the traditional gacaca courts that ad-
dress matters like land disputes. Id.
261. Id. at 226.
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gimes. This bill became law in 1999 and it creates three marital
property regimes and grants women inheritance rights to their
birth family property and marital property ("Matrimonial Re-
gimes, Liberties, and Succession Law") .262 The law only ad-
dresses usufructuary rights because all land in Rwanda belongs
to the state. The default regime is "community of property" and
it is "a contract by which the spouses opt for a marriage settle-
ment based on joint ownership of all their property-moveable
as well as immoveable-and their present and future charges. '"263
The two other options are "limited community of acquests" 26 4
and "separation of property. ' 265 The regime of limited commu-
nity of acquests "is a contract by which spouses agree to pool
their respective properties owned on the day of marriage cele-
bration, to constitute the basis of the acquests as well as the
property acquired during marriage by a common or separate ac-
tivity, donation, legacy, or succession. '"266 The separate property
regime "is a contract by which spouses agree to contribute to the
expenses of the household in proportion to their respective abil-
ities while retaining the right of enjoyment, administration and
free disposal of their personal property. 2 67
The Matrimonial Regimes, Liberties, and Succession Law
similarly governs the inheritance of marital property. For
couples married within the community property regime, the in-
262. Law No. 22/99 of 12/11/1999 to supplement Book One of the civil code and
to institute Part Five regarding matrimonial regimes, liberalities and successions, Offi-
cial Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, art. 4 (community property), arts. 66, 70, 71
(inheritance) (Nov. 15, 1999) (Uganda), available at http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/
2740.pdf [hereinafter Matrimonial Regimes, Liberties, and Succession Law].
263. Id. arts. 2, 3.
264. Acquests refers to property, "acquired by purchase, gift, or any means other
than inheritance." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 24 (8th ed. 2004).
265. Matrimonial Regimes, Liberties, and Succession Law, supra note 262, arts. 2,
7.
266. Id. art. 7. The law notes that:
[a]t the marriage celebration, the spouses who opted for [this regime] shall
establish and submit to the officer of civil status a signed inventory of assets
and liabilities defined by each spouse to constitute the community. Any prop-
erty that is not inventoried as common property shall, be presume to be per-
sonal property.
Id. art. 8.
Both the community property regime and the limited community of acquests re-
gime are dissolved by divorce, legal separation, or voluntary modification of the martial
regime. Id. art. 24.
267. Id. art. 11.
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testate succession rules are as follows: "the surviving spouse shall
ensure the administration of the entire patrimony while assum-
ing the duties of raising the children and assistance to the needy
parents of the de cujus [deceased] ."268 For couples utilizing the
separation of property regime the heirs pursuant to intestate suc-
cession are in the following order: the children, the parents, the
full siblings, the half-siblings, and the uncles and aunts of the
deceased.269 Couples using the limited community of acquests
regime adhere to the community property intestate rules for the
jointly owned property and the separation of property rules for
the separate property. 270 Children, both male and female, can
inherit from their parents. The law grants all legitimate chil-
dren, as defined within civil law, the right to "inherit in equal
parts without any discrimination between male and female chil-
dren."271
In Rwanda the default rules regarding women's access to
and ownership of land changed as a result of direct government
intervention prompted by children's and women's rights groups
and the Ministry of Gender, Family and Social Affairs.272 Yet
context was also important. Post-genocide Rwanda had a popu-
lation that was majority female, and there were a significant
number of female-headed households in need of land.27" Addi-
tionally, through the death of many Rwandan men and the sig-
nificant numbers in exile, there were fewer men to challenge
women's specific claims to land.27 4 Despite the provision of legal
rights providing for women's access to and ownership of land,
268. Id. art. 70.
269. Id. art. 66.
270. Id. art. 71.
271. Id. art. 50. The law also makes provisions for minor children:
The family council shall determine the part of the patrimony to be earmarked
for the raising of minors and the part to be shared between all the children of
the de cujus [deceased]. When all children have reached the age of majority,
they shall equally share in the rest of the patrimony initially earmarked for
raising the minors.
Id. art. 51.
272. This ministry was quite active in post-genocide Rwanda in advocating legal
reforms to further gender equality. See Banks, supra note 59, at 148-53 (discussing the
role of the Ministry in collaboration with civil society actors in the constitution-making
process).
273. Burnet & RISD, supra note 245, at 185.
274. Rose, supra note 181, at 229 (stating that some leaders found for women be-
cause there were no known men left in the family).
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both within the customary legal system and the statutory legal
system, women have faced challenges in settling land disputes.275
The challenges arise when male family members challenge wo-
men's land claims. Women's success when bringing land dis-
putes tends to occur when they were supporting minor children,
had resided on the land in question continuously, or had cared
for the original owner or provided him with resources. 276 Yet if
women were seeking land that was desired by adult male rela-
tives-even sons-women's land claims were generally consid-
ered to be weak.277 Despite the existence of legal protections
through customary rules and statutory rights, the belief that wo-
men's land rights are secondary to those of men has hampered
women. Research on current conceptions of women's land
rights in Rwanda has found that men and women alike generally
believe that land belongs to the family head and family property
should be used in the best interests of the family. While women
were recognized as possible family heads, common beliefs of
men were that women were not as capable as men in managing
land.278 With regard to use or ownership rights, men and wo-
men stated that male and female children should be treated
equally in the distribution of family land, but they worried that
dividing land equally would exacerbate land scarcity and small
family holding issues. 279  Many men expressed concern that
there simply is not enough land to distribute. Dividing the small
family holdings even further would not enable any family to sus-
tain itself. Thus, these men concluded that female children
should not inherit family land. 28" The assumption is that women
can gain access to land through their husbands. Many male re-
spondents expressed concern that women could inherit land
from two sources, their parents and their husbands, while men
could only inherit from their parents. A significant number of
female respondents agreed with regard to married women, but
believed unmarried women and women separated from their
275. The legal situation in the mid-1990s also created opportunities for women to
address their land disputes. The uncertainty of the rules and the gaps between the
customary and statutory legal systems enabled some women to utilize their wealth, edu-
cation, and social connections to their advantage. Id. at 225.
276. Id. at 227.
277. Id.
278. Burnet & RISD, supra note 245, at 189, 196.
279. Id. at 196.
280. Id.
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husbands should have access to their parent's property.21
Despite the enactment of statutory law realizing the CEDAW
obligation that men and women have the same rights to marital
property, the implementation of the law has faced cultural and
customary obstacles. The norms and motivations underlying the
statutory reforms are not supported by a significant number of
rural Rwandans.28 2 In light of the concerns noted above, rural
women believe that the law is only helpful to urban women who
work and wealthy families that have large landholdings.2"' The
1999 law faces resistance "because of its collision with prevailing
customs in terms of conceptions of marriage and inheri-
tance.'"284
Public awareness campaigns have been very effective in let-
ting women know that the inheritance laws have changed. The
use of radio broadcasts, newspaper articles, and word-of-mouth
increased knowledge of the Matrimonial Regimes, Liberties, and
Succession Law and many women have tried to use it to resolve
specific land disputes. 285 Yet these campaigns have not ad-
dressed the foundational norms that make it acceptable to privi-
lege male children's property rights over female children's
rights in the face of land scarcity. The idea that women's land
rights are secondary to men's persists, and, absent collaboration
with local elites within the customary legal system, the conflicts
between the statutory and customary norms will persist.
III. SHIFIING SOCIAL MEANING THROUGH
COLLABORATION
The CEDAW Committee's approach to adaptation is to pre-
sent CEDAW norms and obligations to the general public
through awareness-raising campaigns and educational measures.
These measures are promoted as a means of creating an ena-
bling environment to challenge cultural traditions, transform
cultural patterns of conduct, and change discriminatory stereo-
types. The emphasis is on knowledge and understanding.8 6 Yet
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 197.
285. See Rose, supra note 181, at 246 n.125; see also Burnet & RISD, supra note 245,
at 195.
286. See supra notes 146-57 and accompanying text.
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the emergence of a new frame within public discourse as a credi-
ble alternative requires more than the introduction of the new
frame. It requires corresponding shifts in the states' political op-
portunity structure, particularly the discursive opportunity struc-
ture.28 7 Two particularly useful shifts relate to political access for
CEDAW advocates and supporters and state collaboration with
influential allies. As discussed in Part I.B., influential allies, spe-
cifically locally-based allies, serve as an additional resource, pro-
viding location-specific knowledge regarding the discursive op-
portunity structure, access to relevant institutions and individu-
als, material resources, and, perhaps most importantly in this
context, legitimacy.288 Keck and Sikkink's work identifies spe-
cific components of the discursive opportunity structure that are
key factors in determining whether or not new ways of conceptu-
alizing ideas and practices will become viable alternatives within
public discourse.289
The narrow range of locally-based allies has been detrimen-
tal to shifting public discourse and attitudes about women's
property rights. 290 The introduction of new ideas regarding wo-
men's relationship with property alone has not been sufficient
for changing "social and cultural patterns of conduct."291 While
this is a long-term process, it is one that also requires structural
reform. This Article has focused on the role of the discursive
opportunity structure, political access, and influential allies.
29 2
287. See FERREE ET AL., supra note 54, at 62.
288. See supra Part I.B.
289. KECK & SIKKINK, ACTIvIsTs, supra note 81, at 192-93 (identifying symbolic, in-
formation, accountability, and leverage politics as key strategies for bringing about dis-
cursive changes in the positions of states and international organizations).
290. Advocates and scholars writing about women's movements throughout sub-
Saharan Africa are divided on the question of whether advocates should seek to reform
customary land tenure systems or statutory laws. In Uganda the decision was made to
focus on statutory laws and seek to obtain legal rights guaranteeing women's access to
and ownership of land within the state's statutory legal regime. The justification for this
strategy is based on a concern that community leaders responsible for administering
disputes within the customary land tenure system were hostile to reforms increasing
women's access to land and ownership opportunities. Yet in ignoring this influential
segment of the state's elites in developing and deploying its framing strategy, the advo-
cates have been unable to shift the public discourse regarding default co-ownership or
the social meaning of married women's property rights. See supra notes 74, 207 and
accompanying text.
291. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 5(a)
292. The relevance of political and legal structural reform has been adequately
addressed within the rule of law literature. See, e.g., Carothers, supra note 46.
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These types of reforms can be effective in facilitating either in-
ternalization or conformity, the end product of persuasion and
acculturation. It creates a context in which gender equality is
presented as a fundamental norm either within the state's cul-
ture or to members of the reference group. Collaboration with
local elites can assist in identifying the supportive aspects of the
state's discursive opportunity structure and developing a frame
that builds upon those ideas. In the example discussed in Part I
regarding the use of education to eradicate FGC, the project
combined education, influential allies, and government sup-
port.293 The campaign not only targeted individual members of
society, it worked to obtain the support of religious leaders who
were key figures within the community. Additionally, these pro-
grams received the support of the government. The social
meaning attached to FGC was able to shift because FGC was
framed as a literacy, family planning, and health care issue and
that frame was able to gain traction and resonance because of
support from significant components of the state's political op-
portunity structure."'
Increasing political access for CEDAW supporters provides
new avenues for these actors to impact the political process and
provide additional support for CEDAW-consistent legal reforms.
The access that CEDAW supporters gain, however, should facili-
tate internal inclusion rather than eradicating external exclu-
sion. 295 The internal inclusion of CEDAW supporters within po-
litical institutions increases the legitimacy and prominence of
the CEDAW norms, which can facilitate internalization and con-
formity. Yet without additional shifts in the state's discursive op-
portunity structure, political access will be insufficient as demon-
strated by the Rwanda case study.29 6 The CEDAW Committee's
compliance discourse pays insufficient attention to the variety of
293. See supra Part I.
294. See Cao, supra note 57, at 405.
295. External exclusion refers to "the ways in which individuals are prevented from
participating in decision-making forums." Banks, supra note 59, at 112 (citing IRIS
MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 55 (2000)). Internal exclusion exists when
"people lack effective opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they
have access to the fora and procedures of decision-making." IRIs MARION YOUNG, INCLU-
SION AND DEMOCRACY 55 (2000).
296. This is the point made by Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks and others about
the need for rule of law reform to address adaptation. See supra notes 44-45 and accom-
panying text.
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relevant legal institutions within the discursive opportunity struc-
ture, particularly the role of influential allies within customary
legal systems.29 7 Collaboration is overwhelmingly recognized as
relevant for institutional reform in the area of obtaining techni-
cal and financial assistance, preparing the periodic report, fol-
lowing-up implementation for CEDAW, formulating and imple-
menting policies and programs, and enacting monitoring mech-
anisms z.2 ' The Committee is increasingly recognizing the value
of collaborating with meaning-making institutions and actors in
its recommendations. State parties are encouraged to collabo-
rate with civil society organizations, such as women's organiza-
tions and human rights organizations, in the adaptation process.
There is, however, no specific recommendation that state parties
collaborate with those responsible for administering the custom-
ary legal system. 99
297. Collaborating with influential actors within the society connects the state's
interest in gender equality with relevant reference groups. Partnering with such groups
is important whether the goal is internalization or conformity. Working with society
members who are influential in setting and regulating norms and values legitimizes the
CEDAW norms. Such legitimization supports the internalization of these norms. Addi-
tionally, acculturation works through "peer pressure," which requires that there be a
group whose acceptance individuals or states are interested in obtaining. If the refer-
ence group supports the CEDAW norms then those individuals interested in identifying
with the reference group will conform to these norms. The social rewards and punish-
ments provided by these reference groups will facilitate conformity. Partnering with
reference groups is relevant for shifting the political opportunity structure in ways that
support CEDAW advocates and for deploying social rewards and punishments. Yet it
will be difficult for the CEDAW Committee to make specific recommendations in this
area without specific knowledge regarding the structural and cultural aspects of the
state. Giving general recommendations encouraging state parties to identify these
groups and then partner with them is similar to the general collaboration recommenda-
tions currently being made. To facilitate the Committee being able to credibly make
such recommendations the Committee should utilize the services of country experts.
298. See, e.g., Benin Comments, supra note 131, 162; Nigeria Comments, supra
note 131, 294; Sierra Leone Comments, supra note 131, 368; Tanzania Comments,
supra note 131, 238.
299. Occasionally there are general suggestions to collaborate with community
leaders, but customary legal officials are not specified. See, e.g., Angola Comments, supra
note 131, 147 ("Introduce measures to modify or eliminate cultural practices and
stereotypes that discriminate against women-work with civil society organizations, wo-
men's groups and community leaders as well as teachers and the media to undertake
such efforts."); Gambia Comments, supra note 131, 196 (recognizing the importance
of involving civil society and religious leaders for eliminating female genital mutilation
("FGM")); Mali Comments, supra note 131, 1 194 ("undertake such efforts in collabora-
tion with civil society organizations, women's non-governmental organizations
("NGOs") and community leaders, with a view to changing discriminatory social and
cultural patterns of conduct about the roles and responsibilities of women and men in
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Shifting the public discourse around women's property
rights in Rwanda and Uganda followed different paths and en-
ded with different legal reforms. In Rwanda advocates support-
ing increased property rights for women partnered with the gov-
ernment, which provided political access. 30 0 This partnership
also generated substantive input regarding the content of the
reforms and potential legitimacy for the resulting reforms.
There was, however, little to no reported collaboration with cus-
tomary legal officials. The advocates for women's land rights de-
veloped a national network of women's organizations that lob-
bied government officials. The situation in Rwanda after the ge-
nocide was one in which the socio-cultural dimensions of the
state's discursive political opportunity structure had changed." 1
Social norms regarding women's land tenure shifted to address
the reality of a predominantly female population. 2 Few men
were present to challenge women's specific land claims and the
government supported the formalization of gender equality
norms. 0 3 The State provided resources for the drafting and en-
actment of legislation that enables women to inherit land from
their fathers and husbands and creates default co-ownership for
married couples.3 0 4 Collaboration with customary legal officials
may have been easier than anticipated in light of these socio-
cultural shifts.
In contrast, advocates for women's property rights in
Uganda never succeeded in obtaining the overwhelming support
of executive government officials. 0 5 The relevant cabinet-level
ministries challenged the advocates to prove that the issue of
property rights for women was an issue deserving government
attention. 06 This challenge prompted civil society organizations
the family and in society."); Togo Comments, supra note 131, 154. When such indi-
viduals have been mentioned in this context the Committee has recommended that
they be the target of the awareness-raising efforts. See Ghana Comments, supra note 131,
233; Sierra Leone Comments, supra note 131, 370.
300. See Banks, supra note 59, at 148-53.
301. See supra note 70 for an explanation of the discursive opportunity structure.
302. See Rose, supra note 181, at 199-202.
303. Id. at 214-17.
304. Id.
305. These advocates were successful in obtaining the support of members of Par-
liament as the final vote passing the bill with the co-ownership clause demonstrates.
Uganda Hansard, June 18, 2003, Bills, Third Reading, The Land (Amendment) Bill
(Uganda).
306. See generally Asiimwe, supra note 207.
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to commission a study on women's attitudes regarding land
rights.3 °7 The socio-cultural aspects of the discursive opportu-
nity structure within Uganda overwhelmingly supported norms
reinforcing traditional gender roles. Co-ownership was seen as a
threat to the basic fabric of society.
In addition to lobbying to obtain the support of govern-
ment officials, the advocates in Uganda organized and obtained
the support of various domestic organizations including the
Uganda Land Alliance, the leading domestic NGO working on
land reform.3"' The Ugandan advocates for co-ownership had a
broad base of domestic support for a frame that presented wo-
men's access to land as a basic right. What they lacked was
strong support from executive government officials and officials
within the various customary legal systems. In contrast, in
Rwanda advocates had strong government support, but a narrow
base of domestic support. In both countries there are numerous
examples of violations of the CEDAW obligation of providing
spouses with the same rights regarding the ownership, acquisi-
tion, enjoyment, and disposition of marital property.30 9
The frame that was introduced within the public discourse
failed to resonate with the critical constituents. In Rwanda that
constituency was the broader public and customary legal system
officials. Despite the 1999 laws providing for female inheritance
and default co-ownership for marital property,310 many women's
property claims are challenged based on traditional notions of
property ownership. The advocates were successful in obtaining
legal reform, but they have yet to achieve widespread social re-
form regarding the equality of men's and women's land
rights. 311 When male relatives seek to contest the ownership or
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 16(1)(f).
310. Matrimonial Regimes, Liberties, and Succession Law, supra note 262, arts. 2,
50.
311. Another challenge faced in Rwanda is the significant number of women in
long-term relationships that are not registered marriages. The Matrimonial Regimes,
Liberties, and Succession Law of 2000 only extends default co-ownership to married
couples whose marriages are registered with local officials.
Consequently, many of the property disputes that emerge are between individuals
who do not have registered marriages and are therefore unable to benefit from the
default regime created by the 2000 law. It is not, however, uncommon for states to
extend community property rights to individuals whose marriage is recognized by the
state.
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use of family land they often ignore the statutory and customary
legal rules and principles that challenge their legal position.31 2
Despite statutory law granting women particular rights, women's
land rights are often believed to be secondary to men's land
rights.3'1
The awareness campaigns in Rwanda have increased knowl-
edge about statutory law governing land rights, but it has not
been immediately effective in overcoming the patriarchal norm
privileging men's property rights over women's. This tension is
not rooted in customary law, which traditionally granted women
access to land, yet land scarcity has challenged these traditional
rules.3 1 4 As has been noted by numerous scholars, customary
law, like statutory law, is fluid and responds to political, social,
and economic events occurring within the society. 15 The inclu-
sion of officials responsible for administering customary legal
systems in the adaptation process regarding women's land rights
would assist in the development of effective domestic enforce-
ment mechanisms. The desire not to engage customary legal of-
ficials in the quest for increased land rights for women pretends
that these individuals and their views do not impact the imple-
mentation and enforcement of statutory law. The resources
needed to pursue a land dispute under statutory law are beyond
the reach of many individuals.316 Consequently, dispute settle-
ment options pursuant to customary law are often utilized, which
makes the customary legal officials key participants in protecting
women's land rights. Excluding them from the adaptation pro-
cess divorces the CEDAW obligations and norms from a critical
component of a state's discursive opportunity structure. Such a
disconnect weakens the procedural and substantive aspects of
strategic framing that are central to the adaptation process.
312. See Rose, supra note 181, at 228 ("In a number of cases, blood relatives or in-
laws went against the spirit of customary law such that the blood relatives of unmarried
women denied them land, and the in-laws of legally married women denied them land
after the death of their husbands.").
313. Id. at 227.
314. See supra notes 245-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of customary
land tenure in Rwanda.
315. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 181, at 218; Lynn S. Khadiagala, Justice and Power in
the Adjudication of Women's Property Rights in Uganda, 49 AFR. TODAY 101, 114 (2002).
316. Financial resources are necessary to pay for transportation to the administra-
tive offices or courts where the claim will be heard and to obtain the legal services and
documentation that is necessary to substantiate a legal claim. Rose, supra note 181, at
226.
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The strategic framing in Uganda by advocates for co-owner-
ship focused on equality. Women's access to land was presented
as a basic human right. 17 This frame was deployed through the
media, meetings with executive officials and parliamentarians,
interactions with domestic NGOs, and meetings with members
of the public. The discourse within Parliament utilized a differ-
ent frame, one that focused on the need to protect vulnerable
aspects of the society. Co-ownership was presented as necessary
to provide access to property for women who are abandoned by
their husbands. The Parliamentary debates are replete with
images of decent honorable women left destitute by unsavory
men. 18 Parliamentarians opposed to co-ownership never ques-
tioned the equality of women or the appropriateness of women's
access to land.3 19 Rather opposition was framed as detrimental
to families, providing an unfair advantage to women, or in con-
flict with custom and tradition.
President Museveni shared the concerns raised by oppo-
nents to the co-ownership clause, and he deleted the co-owner-
ship provision when he signed the bill. 20 When revisions to the
Land Act were considered by Parliament during the 2002/2003
321 drfsession, the draft bill did not include provisions for default co-
ownership. Despite advocates' lobbying efforts in 2002 and 2003
and parliamentary support for such provisions in 1998, co-own-
ership was never included in the amended Land Act.322 The op-
position concerns about a shift in the distribution of power
within families were successful. 23 As in Rwanda, the domestic
network supporting default co-ownership rules was not broad
317. See Asiimwe, supra note 207, at 178-79.
318. See, e.g., Uganda Hansard, Apr. 9, 2003, Statement of Prof. Victoria Mwaka,
Woman Representative, Luwero (Uganda); Uganda Hansard, Apr. 9, 2003, Statement
of Ms. Betty Amongi, Woman Representative, Apac (Uganda).
319. Id.
320. See Tripp, supra note 74, at 7-8.
321. Id.
322. The amended Land Act addressed some of the concerns justifying a default
co-ownership regime by granting spouses the "right to have access to and live on family
land" and the right to withhold consent for any transaction regarding the land that
would affect the spouses' rights. Parliamentary Debates, June 17, 2003 (Consideration
and adoption of the report of the select committee on the Land (Amendment) Bill,
2002) (statement of the Chairman of the Select Committee on the Land (Amendment)
Bill, 2002 Mr. Fred Ruhindi), available at http://www.parliament.go.ug/hansard/hans-
view-date.jsp?dateYYYY=2003&dateMM=06&dateDD=17 (last visited Nov. 30, 2008).
323. See Tripp, supra note 74, at 7-8.
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enough. The framing strategy utilized by the advocates for wo-
men's property rights did not target or sufficiently include local
elites, particularly those responsible for administering customary
law.
In response to Uganda's third periodic report submitted in
2000, the CEDAW Committee had specific recommendations re-
garding women's property rights. The Committee began by ex-
pressing concern "that customs and traditional practices, preva-
lent in rural areas, prevent women from inheriting or acquiring
ownership of land and other property. 3 24  The Committee
urged Uganda to "eliminate all forms of discrimination with re-
spect to the ownership, co-sharing and inheritance of land" and
to introduce measures that would address the "negative customs
and traditional practices, especially in rural areas, which affect
full enjoyment of the right to own property by women. '3 25 The
Committee also expressed concern with "the continued exis-
tence of legislation, customary laws and practices on inheritance,
land ownership, [and] widow inheritance . . . that discriminate
against women and conflict with the Constitution and the Con-
vention. 3 26  To address this concern the Committee urged
Uganda to "amend these laws and prohibit such practices" and
to "work with the relevant ministries and non-governmental or-
ganizations, including lawyers' associations and women's groups,
to create an enabling environment for legal reform and effective
law enforcement. 327
The Committee's recommendations to Uganda follow the
general trend of its compliance discourse, emphasizing
programmatic reforms. In addressing the issue of women's ac-
cess to land, the Committee focused on legal rights and
programmatic reforms that would assist in creating and protect-
ing such rights.3 2' The Committee recognized the need for ad-
324. Uganda Comments, supra note 131, 151.
325. Id. 152.
326. Id. 153.
327. Id. 154.
328. The programmatic recommendations are those that urge Uganda to "elimi-
nate all forms of discrimination with respect to the ownership, co-sharing and inheri-
tance of land"; introduce measures to address "negative customs and traditional prac-
tices, especially in rural areas, which affect full enjoyment of the right to own property
by women"; and to "work with the relevant ministries and non-governmental organiza-
tions, including lawyers' associations and women's groups, to create an enabling envi-
ronment for legal reform and effective law enforcement." Id. 152, 154.
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aptation when it recommended that Uganda introduce mea-
sures to address "negative customs and traditional practices" and
that the state "create an enabling environment for legal reform
and effective law enforcement. 3 29 The compliance discourse
within CEDAW's jurisprudence highlights the role of cultural
customs and practices in inhibiting women from having equal
rights to access and own land. Yet, the Committee provides no
structural recommendations, unlike the Committee's recom-
mendations to other states regarding the adaptation process.
The Committee did not urge, recommend, or call on Uganda to
use educational measures or awareness-raising programs to ad-
dress the above-noted adaptation concerns. Rather Uganda is
left to its own devices to determine what measures will address
"negative customs and traditional practices. '3 0
Were the Committee to recognize the variety of legal institu-
tions that can be useful in the adaptation process as meaning-
making institutions, it would be able to acknowledge the need
for state parties to collaborate with customary legal officials. The
Committee's collaboration recommendations tend to focus on
presumed supporters, women's organizations and human rights
organizations. The failure to mention customary legal officials
may be connected to the decisions made by certain gender
equality advocates throughout sub-Saharan Africa that custom-
ary law is the problem to be solved and statutory legal reform is
the answer."'1 The Committee's statements regarding customary
law similarly frame it as a problem, yet the recommendations
never target it for reform.3 3 2 The strategy offered is one in
which statutory law is enacted or revised to invalidate problem-
atic customary law.33 As the Rwanda case study demonstrates, in
states operating with plural legal systems this approach is not ef-
329. Id.
330. Id. 152.
331. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
332. See, e.g., Angola Comments, supra note 131, 191 ("The Committee is con-
cerned about the existence of the dual legal system of civil law and customary law,
which results in continuing discrimination against women, particularly in the field of
marriage and family relations."); Zimbabwe Comments, supra note 131, 139 ("The
Committee notes with great concern that, although the national laws guaranteed the
equal status of women, the continued existence of and adherence to customary laws
perpetuated discrimination against women, particularly in. the context of the family.").
333. See, e.g., Angola Comments, supra note 131, 1 192; Nigeria Comments, supra
note 131, 296.
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fective.3 3 4 Including customary legal officials within the adapta-
tion process would assist in developing frames that draw upon
supportive elements within the customary legal system. Develop-
ing parallels between the customary legal system and the
CEDAW obligations and norms can be useful in creating domes-
tic enforcement mechanisms that will effectively enforce
CEDAW.
CONCLUSION
The CEDAW Committee and other treaty bodies recognize
the importance of domestic enforcement. A key aspect of facili-
tating domestic enforcement is the adoption and adaptation
process. A review of the compliance discourse within the
CEDAW Committee's jurisprudence reveals that the Committee
seeks to encourage and support an adoption and adaptation pro-
cess. Yet the Committee's adaptation recommendations provide
limited guidance due to the emphasis on knowledge, awareness,
and circumscribed collaboration. The constructivist and socio-
logical framing literatures empirically demonstrate and theoreti-
cally explain the role of local elites in the adaptation process.
The application of these insights to the CEDAW Committee's
compliance discourse suggests that collaboration is critical for
the adaptation process.
Within the compliance discourse, treaty bodies like the
CEDAW Committee make three types of recommendations:
structural, legal, and programmatic. To facilitate CEDAW com-
pliance, the Committee seeks to support the development of do-
mestic enforcement mechanisms. A key feature for effective do-
mestic enforcement is creating an enabling environment for law
reform and enforcement. Recognizing the role of norms and
socialization in this process of adaptation, the Committee recom-
334. Rwanda has not submitted a report since the legal reforms extended inheri-
tance rights to girls and women and created a default community property regime for
married couples. Yet the CEDAW norms regarding women's property rights have not
achieved prescriptive status. Women's property rights are often understood to be sec-
ondary to men's property rights. As long as a man is not challenging a women's access
to specific land, the women's rights will be affirmed. Yet if a male family member chal-
lenges a woman's claim, her rights will rarely be affirmed. This situation in Rwanda
exemplifies why the CEDAW Committee conceptualizes compliance as consisting not
only of state behavior conforming to the substantive provisions of the treaty, but also of
creating and strengthening domestic enforcement mechanisms, which requires the ad-
aptation of CEDAW's norms.
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mends that state parties implement educational measures and
awareness-raising programs to increase knowledge about
CEDAW obligations and norms. 335 To support this aspect of do-
mestic enforcement, the Committee overwhelmingly makes
programmatic recommendations. These recommendations gen-
erally encourage states to "take appropriate measures" and to
adopt or implement programs or policies that support particular
CEDAW obligations. The CEDAW Committee's embrace of
norms and the need for adaptation is circumscribed by the Com-
mittee's narrow conception of acceptable collaboration partners.
By focusing on like-minded organizations and individuals, the
Committee does not encourage state parties to engage with
other components of the discursive opportunity structure that
can provide alternative strategies for adaptation. Customary le-
gal officials are key social actors in most communities through-
out sub-Saharan Africa. Excluding these individuals from the ad-
aptation process causes state parties to miss a key opportunity for
successfully framing CEDAW obligations and norms in a way that
will facilitate domestic enforcement.
335. The role of norms in this process has been empirically demonstrated and
theoretically explained by legal scholars, political scientists, sociologists, and anthropol-
ogists. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 7; KECK & SIKKINK, AcrmvisTs, supra note 81; Goodman &
Jinks, Influence States, supra note 17; FERREE ET AL., supra note 54; MERRY, supra note 71.
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